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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

MAKING SENSE OF THE DIVINELY BEAUTIFUL: ESSAYS ON
FRIENDSHIP, LOVE, AND ATTRACTION

Essay 1: As interpersonal communication has changed with the proliferation of
technology-based forms of meeting and interacting with others, philosophers have begun
considering ways in which these new types of communication have altered the landscape
of our relationships. Although philosophers are split on whether online friendships can
measure up to the Aristotelean standard of virtue friendship, none have questioned the
importance of truth telling or accurate representation of oneself in the context of online
sharing. The underlying assumption is that in a virtuous friendship, there is no role
whatsoever for anything other than strict honestly. I disagree with this assumption
because I think it fails to account for the beneficial, generative potential of being
approximately honest with one another in the context of close friendship. In this essay, I
examine the role honesty plays in online friendship and make a case for a kind of
relationship I call generative friendship, which forgoes the standard of strict honesty in
favor of a mutually created, idealized rendering of the self and one’s friend that
resembles artistic interpretation as applied to the context of friendship.
Essay 2: One of the most interesting discussions in recent scholarship on love
involves a question concerning what we are attracted to when we love someone. In
seeking to understand this, philosophers have offered answers ranging from the claim that
lovers respond to specific qualities or properties possessed by the beloved, to more broadranging notions such as love can only be understood as an attraction to the entire person
of the beloved. Although each attempt to identify the nature of love succeeds in
addressing certain aspects of the phenomenon, frequently it is at the expense of some
other, equally important feature. The result has been a series of analytical essays offering
competing claims or ad hoc additions aimed at shoring up these inadequacies. In an
attempt to reconcile competing views on the nature of love—seemingly at an impasse—
this essay suggests viewing love in narrative terms as a way to bring these views together
as complements to one another, while at the same time providing a framework for
understanding love as a coherent whole.

Essay 3: In keeping with the characteristic emphasis on rationality and the will,
Stoic thinkers such as Epictetus and Seneca conceptualize intimate relationships,
including friendships, by focusing on critical thinking and choice. On this view, persons
become friends through an analytical process of weighing pros and cons and then
deciding either to pursue or refrain from friendship. In contrast, this essay describes
friendship formation—in particular, the initial stage of attraction to a particular person—
in terms of recognition communicated primarily through embodied experience at an
unconscious level. Drawing on concepts from both ancient and contemporary philosophy,
this essay sketches a phenomenological account of attraction as the recognition of values
expressed bodily through such things as comportment, language and gestures.

KEYWORDS: Online Friendship, Honesty, Narrative, Love, Phenomenology of
Attraction
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CHAPTER 1. TRUTH TELLING AND ONLINE FRIENDSHIPS: A CASE FOR
“APPROXIMATE HONESTY”
1.1

Introduction

As interpersonal communication has changed with the proliferation of

technology-based forms of meeting and interacting with others, philosophers have begun
considering ways in which these new types of communication have altered the landscape
of our relationships. Among those interested in this topic, focus has converged upon

Aristotle’s formulation of the three kinds of friendship, with particular attention given to
virtue friendship, which Aristotle grants an esteemed status by characterizing it both as
the highest form of friendship available to humans, and also as “complete.” In calling
virtue friendship complete, Aristotle points out that, in addition to the mutual cultivation
of virtue, friendships of this sort partake in each of the other kinds of friendship as well;
namely, they prove to be both pleasurable and useful. Recently, debate about whether
friendships conducted mainly or exclusively through online interactions qualify as “real”
and how they stack up against traditional face-to-face relationships has dominated the
conversation. While most are willing to grant technology a role in maintaining an existing
relationship, few have suggested that online friendships rise to the high expectations
demanded of the Aristotelian virtue friendship. Thus, two camps have emerged: there are
those who claim that technology has largely undermined and debased the institution of
friendship—or at least threatens to—and those who maintain that technology can be used
as a tool to enhance existing friendships, and as a vehicle to forge significant and
meaningful new ones.
Generally, those we might call “technology skeptics” argue that while email,
texting, and social media may offer convenient and useful avenues for certain kinds of
1

communication (often characterized as quick and/or shallow), reliance on or overuse of

these tech-mediated methods is incompatible with close friendships. Reasons for
reluctance to embrace this type of communication vary, but most critics share the
conviction that virtual friendships inevitably lack some essential features present in

person-to-person relationships and this, in turn, makes them inferior.
Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews were among the first philosophers to attempt
to address this issue. In a 2000 article titled “Unreal Friends,” Cocking and Matthews
begin with the notion that “context affects content”—the circumstances under which we
communicate with one another bear upon the information we are able to exchange (225).
This point is used to argue that due to certain “structural features” of internet
correspondence—such as how one’s self-presentation is limited to “voluntary
disclosures”—internet friends cannot meet the demands of the complete friendship
Aristotle describes. Specifically, Cocking and Matthews warn that voluntary selfdisclosures are vulnerable to distortion and thus they object to the way internet
correspondence, as a non-embodied form of communication, “permits and disposes us to
present a skewed picture to others of what we are like” (225).
In fact, according to Cocking and Matthews, more than one structural feature of
internet correspondence contributes to the freedom and leverage wielded by individuals

as they craft versions of themselves they wish to put forward to others. Time
constrictions, pressure to react to bodily cues and facial expressions, fear of betraying
oneself, physically, under personal scrutiny—outside of traditional face-to-face

interactions, each of these fades to minimal relevancy. Instead, when communicating
virtually, Cocking and Matthews point out that “I am able to present myself to others

2

with a high level of control and choice” (228). In exclusively online contexts, the person

we make available to others turns out to be a
carefully constructed self, one that is able, for example, to concoct much
more careful and thought-out responses to questions than I am able to in

the non-virtual case. In the virtual case I can construct a highly controlled
and chosen self-presentation. I can play down, put a positive or lighthearted spin on, or completely screen out the various things I don’t
particularly like about myself. (228)

Without the built-in verification checks of person-to-person interactions, Cocking and

Matthews claim that online friends are at a disadvantage with respect to the accuracy of
their knowledge of one other.
Similar concerns are echoed by others. Several recent critiques of online

relationships cite the possibility, likelihood, and even inevitability of online friendship as
uniquely susceptible to the problem of edited selves. Michael McFall, for instance, argues
that “character-friendships cannot be created and sustained entirely through technological
mediation” because they rely on a type of communication he calls “multi-filtered” (221;
224). McFall makes a distinction between “single” and “multi” filtered communication,
where single-filtered communication, because it is experienced directly by the observer
without additional levels of interpretation, is considered superior in terms of accurate
conveyance of information. As an example of the difference, McFall describes a person
relaying the details of an incident which occurred at a lunch meeting among a group of
co-workers. Unless one is present at the meeting to observe interactions first-hand
(single-filtered), they must rely on the honesty and perceptiveness of the individual
3

providing the report. McFall imagines a scenario where a person recounts an altercation

and then seeks moral advice from a friend who was not present. Because the details come
to the friend already selected and interpreted by the storyteller (multi-filtered), McFall
argues that the friend’s ability to provide guidance has been compromised. With internet

friendships, McFall suggests this kind of multi-filtered communication disadvantage
would be the norm, and would thus have a negative impact on the development of
character friendships.
Not all philosophers have agreed with these critical assessments. As a rejoinder to
this type of objection, Alexis Elder and Adam Briggle argue for the legitimacy of
friendships mediated through technology-based forms of communication. In “Excellent
Online Friendships: An Aristotelian Defense of Social Media” Elder makes a broadranging case for online friendships as real and meaningful. Against opposing claims that
online friendships are inherently less-than, Elder supports her view that friendships
“conducted predominantly online may qualify as the best sort of friendship” by showing
how the Aristotelian elements of “conversation and thought”—essential to complete
friendship—are available to online relationships in much the same way as they are to
non-virtual ones. Citing examples of how friends can share music, photos and video links
with one another as a means to enhance their mutual appreciation for such things, she

effectively demonstrates how “social media preserves the relevantly human and valuable
portions of life, especially reasoning, play, and exchange of ideas” (289; 287).
So far, even among those who argue for the overall legitimacy of online

friendships, philosophers seem content to play defense. They have defended virtual
friendships against charges of non-existence (i.e. that virtual relations are “friends” only

4

in name) and also against shallowness, but so far anyone has yet to make a sustained

positive case for a type of friendship that exists primarily in the non-physical realm, and
because of this fact, benefits from this arrangement and may actually be stronger in some
ways for having done so. Adam Briggle comes closest in his 2008 article, “Real Friends:

How the Internet Can Foster Friendship.” Here, Briggle takes issue with Cocking and
Matthews’ depiction of online relationships as necessarily falling short. In their
argument, Cocking and Matthews’ claim that “within a purely virtual context, the
establishment of close friendship is simply psychologically impossible” (224). Briggle
disagrees. Using a hypothetical example of a correspondence between a Civil War soldier
stationed across the country and a schoolteacher living in Boston, Briggle describes how
a friendship comprised exclusively of written correspondence might develop over time
and contain features conductive to the formation of an intimate connection between these
two men.
Because the case Cocking and Matthews make against virtual friendship hinges
heavily on the necessity of “non-voluntary” disclosures communicated physically during
face-to-face interactions, Briggle points out several ways persons might tend to obscure
themselves—either purposefully or unconsciously—in physical interactions. Examples
include such things as failing to bring up in conversation among fellow soldiers one’s

doubts about the legitimacy of their efforts and seeking to avoid showing evidence of
one’s fears and apprehensions in order to project confidence to one’s peers. These and
other “exquisite acts of mutual pretense” Briggle calls “face-to-face feigning,” and they

are an indisputable element of interpersonal interaction (74). Contrasted against these
rather situational motivations to keep to oneself rather than engage in revealing personal
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conversation, Briggle praises written correspondence as a medium through which

“distance” and “deliberateness” offer remedies for face-to-face feigning and can actually
open up avenues for intimacy (77).
I agree with Briggle here but wish to take his line of reasoning a step further. In

describing the war correspondents’ friendship, Briggle makes a couple of important
qualifications and assumptions. First, he makes note of the fact that the two men who
begin writing one another have not previously met. In many ways, for the sake of
Briggle’s argument, whether the two men knew each other prior to their correspondence
is immaterial. Presumably, had they met briefly some years earlier, or been casual
acquaintances drawn together by the war, neither condition would figure significantly
into their ability to forge a connection in the way he describes. The salient features
contributing to the richness of the correspondence are, in fact, the ones Briggle
highlights—distance and deliberateness. Second, Briggle’s account takes for granted that,
in their writings to one another, each of the men is straightforwardly honest in how they
report their actions, and forthright with respect to their thoughts and feelings. The
underlying assumption here is that when the soldier describes his day—marching, setting
up camp, awaiting orders, preparations for movement, action seen in skirmishes, his
reactions to what he has witnessed—in relating all this, the soldier’s account directly

corresponds to reality.

1.2

Honest Representation: A Self Among Friends

A general concern for what I will call strict honesty in the representation of
oneself and others within the context of friendship is something that seems fundamental.
6

By “strict” in this case, I mean truth-telling that corresponds to reality and attempts, as

much as possible, to present specific details in an accurate way, without embellishment.
In varying ways, all the articles discussed so far have either directly or indirectly
addressed the issue of honesty. This includes enthusiastic tech advocates as well as the

skeptics. Although they find themselves in the position of defending a medium notorious
for the tendency of its users to engage in widespread misrepresentation, aggrandizement
or flat-out deception regarding online personas, at no point do Elder or Briggle suggest
they endorse such deception. Instead, their arguments seek either to minimize the impact
such misrepresentations might have (demonstrating, for example how negative effects
might be mitigated or avoided altogether 1) or to highlight ways in which honest
communication—even online—is still possible. In Elder’s essay, the issue of honesty is
given only brief treatment. Basically, she acknowledges general concern over the
potential for deceptive self-representation via the internet, but dismisses it, noting that
such deceptions are common in face-to-face interactions as well and should therefore
pose no special consideration for online friendship. She concludes: “One ought to
exercise good judgment and discrimination in both circumstances” (292).
Among the technology skeptics? Each of the objections Cocking and Matthews
raise with respect to online relationships has to do with honesty. First, they express

concern that individuals in online relationships are inclined toward misrepresentation of
oneself to others; second, they explain the importance of non-voluntary disclosures
available exclusively through face-to-face contact with friends. The ability to read the

Alexis Elder argues that, due to its nature as written communication, online conversations “are, arguably,
less susceptible to deception” due to the fact that they leave “digital ‘paper trails’” that can then be
investigated and cross-referenced for accuracy (292).
1
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physical cues (i.e. body language) of others is viewed by Cocking and Matthews as an

essential component to friendship precisely because it makes available a more complete
and accurate revelation of details otherwise inaccessible in virtual cases. For Cocking and
Matthews, the distinct value of non-virtual friendship lies in the fact that direct contact

allows friends to make observations and deductions about each other’s behaviors that are
as faithful to reality as possible. In both cases, communicating information considered
mismatched or incomplete when viewed against reality is assumed to be detrimental to
close friendship. In fact, honesty is so necessary to the function and health of a
relationship of any kind that it nearly passes without comment. One seems automatically
to assume strict honesty is a requirement for a non-dysfunctional friendship—most
certainly for character friendship. After all, honesty is a virtue.
Shannon Vallor, chair of the Ethics of Data and Artificial Intelligence department
at the Edinburgh Futures Institute, has authored several works on the intersection of
friendship and technology. In a recent essay, Vallor advocates for the use of virtue ethics
as a normative framework through which one might view questions about how we can
best use technology to foster healthy human relationships. Toward the end of the essay,
Vallor issues an invitation for tech users to prioritize the virtue of honesty in crafting
their internet selves. Like Cocking and Matthews, Vallor voices apprehension at the way

many have created an online presence that is less than honest. “Construction of a profile,”
she notes, encourages members to construct a carefully edited version of themselves, a
version perhaps aimed more at drawing in as many ‘friends’ as possible than at exposing

one’s authentic personality” (Social 166). Implicit in Vallor’s criticism here is the
underlying suggestion—shared by all—that any type of communication which falls short
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of the standards of strict honesty is problematic, casting shades of doubt over personal

trust and threatening to undermine the possibility of friendship in general, and virtue
friendship in particular.
So, is this all there is to say on the matter? Is strict honesty a necessary

requirement for close character friendships? In what follows I want to consider, for a
moment, the merits of setting aside the rigorous standards of strict honesty in favor of
what might be called approximate honesty. Contrasted against the preoccupation with
presenting things exactly as they are—a practice associated with strict honesty—
approximate honesty focuses instead on possibility, potential and perfection: opening up
space for possibilities, maximizing potential and striving for perfection. For a certain
kind of friendship, the advantages of approximate honesty may be significant. It allows
for the prospect of friends (at times) to be approximately honest with one another as they
present aspects of their lives in an idealized fashion, within a space opened by distance,
which is designed to facilitate the mutual creation of something beautiful. The remainder
of this essay will describe such a relationship—which I call generative friendship—and
will discuss the conditions under which communication within the context of the
friendship might not satisfy the standards of strict honesty, and yet still qualify as an
intimate character friendship. This kind of friendship is one that has not been considered

in the literature thus far.
I am interested in a specific kind of friendship where the “reading” or ascertaining
of the details of one’s life becomes irrelevant because the friendship is centered on

something else entirely. In such cases, the particular details of one’s life fade out of focus
as the friends shift their attention to ideas. Under ideal circumstances, this kind of

9

relationship can play an important role in the creative, intellectual and moral

development of an individual. Because creativity, reasoning, and moral accountability are
elements of logos—the distinctive features of human flourishing—generative friendship
meets Aristotle’s high standard for complete friendship.

1.3

The Role of the Beautiful in Creative, Intellectual and Moral
Development

In seeking to describe what he hoped to achieve in creating works of art, the PreRaphaelite painter Edward Burne-Jones said, “I mean, by a picture, a beautiful romantic
dream of something that never was, never will be—in a light better than any light that
ever shone—in a land no one can define, or remember, only desire—and the forms are
divinely beautiful” (qtd in Smith). The kind of vision offered here is one where art is seen

as an idealization; where the role of the artist is to re-present, through imaginative
interpretation, an image of something not fashioned with strict allegiance to how things
appear “in reality,” but how things might be if they were to exist in a perfected state.

As an example of how Burne-Jones’ philosophy of art might be applied to a
particular work, consider Ophelia, a painting by fellow Pre-Raphaelite and Burne-Jones
contemporary John Everett Millais. Millais’ depiction of Ophelia floating face-up, her

body strewn with flowers, having drowned in despair, is notable for the aesthetic beauty
with which the tragic scene is rendered. On the one hand, Millais’ attention to detail—
including each flower petal and frond—achieves an impressive, nearly photographic level
of accuracy. He spent many months on location painting en plein air along the Hogsmill
River in Surrey, capturing details of actual flowers as they appeared along the banks
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(Tate). In this sense at least, Millais’ Ophelia can be considered naturalistic or realistic.

His son John even claimed that when a botany professor was unable to take his students
to the country for field observation, he opted instead to have them study the flowers
painted in Ophelia as substitutes “instructive as nature itself” (Tate).

And yet, as closely and accurately as Millais strove to reproduce the natural
features in crafting his landscape for Ophelia, elements of its composition are decidedly
idealistic. Most obviously, the many varieties of flowers along the banks, floating in the
water, and tangled in Ophelia’s dress serve as a beautiful backdrop for the scene, but
astute observers have pointed out that the kinds of flowers Millais depicts in the painting
would never have appeared together naturally at any one time, as they have different
bloom periods throughout the spring and summer months (Tate). The flowers the artist
includes, then, are not intended to be a direct representation of what he was seeing;
instead, they are deliberate choices selected to function as literary references and objects
imbued with symbolic significance. While several the flowers are mentioned by
Shakespeare in Hamlet (crow flowers, nettles and daisies, for example), others were
added by Millais due to their symbolic associations (forget-me-nots, and meadowsweet,
for instance2), as well as for general aesthetic purposes3. So, in calling the painting
idealistic, we mean both in aesthetic terms and also with respect to communicating

meaning. The completed image Millais ultimately presents to the viewer is not meant to
function like a snapshot of a scene from Shakespeare to be taken in and scrutinized
against “reality” (whatever that would mean, since the episode to which this painting

From “Wear Your Rue with Indifference” secretgardening.wordpress.com
According to secretgardening.wordpress.com, “Millais originally included some daffodils in the painting
not observed in Ewell [. . .] as he felt the painting needed more yellow. But his friend, the poet Tennyson,
suggested that they were not appropriate as they symbolized false hope.”
2
3
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refers is itself a fictitious event to begin with); rather, Ophelia is an aesthetically

idealized image to contemplate and enjoy.
Here art achieves approximate representation. Each of the flowers in Ophelia
appears in the painting because it contributes aesthetically or thematically to the work as

a whole. But if the artist were bound to a strictly accurate or “true to life” representation
of the landscape, the flowers could not be presented in the same way, and arguably,
something (symbolism; aesthetic balance) would be lost. Because the depiction is not
strictly accurate, there’s a sense in which the artist engages in a kind of deception. But
unlike some forms of deception which aim at diverting the audience away from truth, this
approximation is honest in that it aims at truth. It is what might called a beautiful lie, and
is analogous to what I mean in allowing for “approximate honesty” in generative
friendship. Like Millais’ Ophelia, approximate honesty in friendship will be starkly
honest and straightforwardly accurate in some aspects, while presenting an idealized
vision in others.
In art we encounter something (an image; a verbal description) familiar enough to
be recognized, but which is presented to the viewer at enough of a distance so as to
inspire and motivate us to continue journeying toward this ideal. What we appreciate
when we appreciate art is just this representation of possibility. When Burne-Jones’ says

of the project he envisions for himself as an artist—to create an image that “never was,
never will be”—he is appealing to just this kind of otherworldly sense of perfection. He
recognizes that the image he strives to create can never exist in the tangible world of the

body; it can only exist as an idea in the realm of the intellect. Nevertheless, it is still a
goal to be pursued.

12

The role that such a beautiful, idealized version of reality plays in creative,

intellectual and moral development is varied. For starters, an encounter with beauty
arrests us out of our common, everyday experience. Absent such encounters, the
tendency is toward an unreflective carrying out of tasks that are overwhelmingly centered

around physical, bodily needs and concerns. Beauty, though, interrupts this pattern and
offers a glimpse into the realm of reason and morality. Once it engages us, a thing of
beauty captures and holds our attention; in some cases, beauty can trigger recognition of
alternative possibilities, hitherto unconsidered. At its best, beauty calls attention to the
distance between what is and what could be, creating a space for the actualization of
something new, perhaps more beautiful and full of wonder than previously imagined.
Additionally, experiencing beauty offers a respite from the gritty reality of our lives, thus
paving the way for recharging motivation while simultaneously offering an impetus for
us to maximize our potential. In the context of friendship, the mutual apprehension of
beauty gives each something to long for, to strive for, to hope for, and to work toward; in
Platonic terms: it connects them to the ideal world of the Forms.

1.4

Contra Commonplace

One distinguishing feature of the Aristotelian virtue friendship is the way in
which the individuals involved in the relationship contribute to the moral and intellectual
growth of the other. Over the course of their time knowing one another, each becomes a
better person because they are friends. Speaking of the friendship of “the excellent
person” in relation to another excellent person, Aristotle says, “He must, then, perceive
his friend’s being together [with his own], and he will do this when they live together and
13

share conversation and thought. For in the case of human beings, what seems to count as

living together is the sharing of conversation and thought, not sharing the same pasture,
as in the case of grazing animals” (NE IX.9, italics mine). Presumably, this happens
through the regular, meaningful exchange of ideas. Although ideally Aristotle envisions

this interchange in terms of face-to-face interactions,4 as others have shown, it is still
possible to cultivate excellent friendships, even at a distance. Physical distance, as well as
separation from the personal lives of our friends, may even offer advantages when
compared to traditional in-person friendships. Knowing someone almost exclusively
through their ideas seems as close to the Socratic ideal of minimizing intrusion from
bodily distractions as we can come within the context of friendship. Furthermore,
diminishing the role of the personal in the relationship helps insulate it from lapsing into
an exchange of commonalities.
It is precisely this desire —to remain in the realm of the extraordinary, of the
ideally beautiful—that animates generative friendship. In calling the friendship
generative, I mean that a fundamental quality of the relationship is the way in which the
structure of the friendship conduces to the creation of something new—something that
might not be obtainable through traditional face-to-face interactions. This particular kind
of relationship is an intellectual partnership maintained predominately online or mediated

through correspondence. Like the beautiful image an artist can create when afforded the
liberty to represent things not strictly as they are but as they could be, a friendship
focused on ideas and maintained over distance could also benefit from exercising a kind

of “poetic license” in the relationship. In a sense, the generative aspect of the relationship

4

“Living together seems to be most characteristic of friendship” (NE IX.10).
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is a function of viewing it as if it were a work of art, a creative project, mutually

undertaken by two individuals striving together to imagine and then create—as much as
possible—perfectly excellent versions of themselves. Of course, actual achievement of
the goal of perfection is not obtainable; nonetheless, the striving toward, the effort

undertaken to approximate an ideal, is essentially Platonic.
According to Plato, we dwell in the realm of becoming, of appearances. Because
of this, humans are relegated to producing approximations of ideals. Our ability to do this
well is hampered by the fact that we are embodied creatures, and our bodies inundate us
with a continuous series of demands. Food, drink, sleep, shelter—whatever is needed for
survival, plus many additional desires aimed at comfort and pleasure—generally
speaking, these physical concerns occupy an outsized portion of our thoughts. In the
Phaedo, Socrates explains how the body acts as a hindrance to the contemplative life of
the mind. Although the only way to completely rid ourselves of such distractions is to be
separated from our bodies through death, Socrates describes how we might attempt to
strive toward knowledge in the meantime:
He will do this most perfectly who approaches the object with thought alone,
without associating any sight with his thought, or dragging in any sense
perception with his reasoning, but who using pure thought alone, tries to track

down each reality pure and by itself, freeing himself as far as possible from eyes
and ears and, in a word, from the whole body, because the body confuses the soul
and does not allow it to acquire truth and wisdom when it is associated with it.

(65-71)
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Insofar as online friendships offer a way to bracket the physical distractions which

preclude us from focusing on the more important rational elements, they seem to offer at
least one potential advantage over face-to-face interactions.
Along similar lines, in his essay dedicated to the subject of friendship, Ralph

Waldo Emerson describes the ubiquity of friendly interactions with others, which he says
is marked by kindness and pleasant exchanges. Highest praise, however, is reserved for a
rare kind of friendship involving kindred souls whose focus is on intellectual and spiritual
concerns 5. With respect to these special friendships of the soul, Emerson advocates for
establishing and maintaining a certain level of distance from one’s friend. Specifically, he
thinks becoming familiar with the mundane, day-to-day details of each other’s lives
would do nothing to bring friends closer to one another. In fact, he seems to hold that
accumulation of such banal personal information—what is eaten and worn and
experienced; the scheduling, planning, and running of a household—would achieve the
opposite effect. For Emerson, there’s a sense in which having this sort of knowledge
about someone can strip away the beauty and mystery surrounding that individual and
potentially rob the relationship of that which makes it rare: “The hues of the opal, the
light of the diamond, are not to be seen if the eye is too near,” he reminds (“Friendship”).
In lieu of seeking personal closeness with our friend, Emerson suggests we treat

them with reverence. For him, this entails a willingness to forego common knowledge
about a friend in favor of the extraordinary, the significant, the meaningful. “Friendship
demands a religious treatment,” he says, “Reverence is a great part of it. Treat your friend

as a spectacle. Of course he has merits that are not yours, and that you cannot honor if

5

For Emerson, these are essentially the same.
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you must needs hold him close to your person. Stand aside; give those merits room; let

them mount and expand. Are you the friend of your friend’s buttons, or of his thought?”
And elsewhere: “Why should we desecrate noble and beautiful souls by intruding on
them?” he asks, “Why insist on rash personal relations with your friend? Why go to his

house, or know his mother and brother and sisters? Why be visited by him at your own?
Are these things material to our covenant? (“Friendship”).
Becoming too familiar with someone is seen here as an obstacle to both the
uniqueness of the bond and to the goal of intellectual and spiritual growth. Like Socrates,
Emerson views everyday concerns such as household relations and the day-to-day
management of one’s affairs as inconsequential and argues that investment in obtaining
this kind of trivial knowledge about your friend wastes precious energy on distractions.
Instead, he seeks to elevate friendship to a higher plane: “Let him be to me a spirit” he
offers in place of a common embodied relationship.
What type of activity, then, does Emerson think is conducive to this special kind
of friendship? Due to our nature as rational souls, true intimacy, he argues, can only be
established when friends exchange, examine, and hone ideas with one another. And how
best would such exchanges take place? Unsurprisingly, rather than suggest friends sit
down with one another and converse in person, Emerson favors mediated

communication, particularly writing: “To my friend I write a letter and from him I
receive a letter . . . it is a spiritual gift worthy of him to give and of me to receive.” And
again, “A message, a thought, a sincerity, a glance from him I want, but not news, nor

pottage;” “I can get politics and chat and neighborly conveniences from cheaper
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companions,” he says, but “Should not the society of my friend be to me poetic, pure,

universal and great as nature itself?” (“Friendship”).
The distance Emerson aims at establishing between noble souls is intended as
protection against the relationship getting sullied by non-rational concerns or reduced to

the level of the commonplace. Although he does not speak of friendship in terms of
creating a work of art, part of the allure of maintaining personal and physical distance
between friends is the space it opens up for the imagination. Near the beginning of his
reflection on the pleasures of friendship, Emerson recounts what it is like anticipating the
arrival of an esteemed individual, known only by reputation. His account makes an
unexpected pivot, however, when he remarks that once the stranger begins to speak, the
elation dissipates. This is not so much because the speaker’s words themselves
disappoint, but because a mystery has been unveiled. One understands, then, Emerson’s
insistence on keeping his most valued friends at arm’s length: “To a great heart [the
friend] will still be a stranger in a thousand particulars, that he may come near in the
holiest ground” (“Friendship”). There is something to be said, after all, for enshrining an
ideal.

1.5

Approximate Honesty and the Ideal Self

Having first surveyed recent scholarship on the pros and cons of online
friendships, noting that, for their many differences, an unexamined consensus on the role
of honesty has emerged, I now want to examine that premise. Briefly stated, the
assumption is this: In a virtuous friendship, there is no role whatsoever for anything other
than strict honestly. I disagree with this assumption because I think it fails to account for
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the beneficial, generative potential of being approximately honest with one another in the

context of close friendship.
Approximate honesty. Almost honest? Nearly honest? Approaching honesty? If
you are like most, the phrase itself probably triggers both an initial sense of moral

approbation and also bemused academic smugness. Is she advocating for being dishonest
with one another, or is this just a euphemism for lying? The answer, in a word: neither.
Earlier in the essay we considered the role idealizations—particularly beautiful ones—
play in the intellectual and moral life of an individual and looked at how a work of art
(whether it be a painting or a poem) can engage viewers at the intersection of two worlds,
known variously throughout the history of ideas as: appearance versus reality; becoming
and being; matter and mind; realism and idealism, and so on. Because humans
simultaneously occupy both worlds, I agree with those (like Plato) who have argued that
we dwell in the realm of approximations and find ourselves in the position of having to
strive toward ideals of perfection that we find continually elude us. Artistic interpretation,
then, is a balancing act, standing as it were in the liminal space of our experience and representing elements of that experience to viewers. As such, art is an apt metaphor for
human relationships and offers a model for how we might approach our most valued
friendships.

In the same way an artist observes the world and then portrays those observations
after a fashion—interpretively, aesthetically, symbolically—close friends are also in
possession of a certain kind of knowledge concerning their counterparts. How they

interpret, represent and reflect back that information is itself an act of creation, mutually
offered and exchanged. Partaking of this process, friends engage in nothing less than the
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business of working out their ideal selves. In what remains, I want to make a case for

treating an online intellectual partnership as a work of art which not only allows but
encourages honest “approximations” as a way of projecting ideals to strive toward and
suggesting new ways of being.

But first, a story: I have a friend who, during his tenure as a medical student,
became interested in rock climbing. He was not a climber, although like many 20somethings, he had attempted recreational climbing in a gym setting. But it was after
reading The Night Climbers of Cambridge, a first-hand account of a group of Cambridge
undergrads who, in the 1930’s formed a clandestine club to free-climb campus buildings
at night for the sheer thrill of it, that his curiosity was piqued in earnest. As he
contemplated taking up climbing as a pastime, he visited an outdoor store where an idea
occurred to him. He purchased a carabiner, attached it prominently to his backpack and
waited for someone—an actual rock climber—to take notice and ask about it. The plan
worked brilliantly. An experienced climber did see it, assume my friend was a fellow
climber and engaged him in conversation. Although he did not overtly lie, owning a
professional-grade carabiner and displaying it as if it were a piece of gear owned because
it is used, could arguably be considered posing as a climber. While not much is at stake
here, it is still the case that an essential feature of the story of how my friend actually

became a rock climber is the fact that he at first falsely presented himself as if he already
was one.
The method employed by my friend to find his climbing partner illustrates, in

part, what I mean by approximate honesty. It is not far from true that this aspiring rock
climber can claim climbing as a hobby; he is interested, he scouted out entry level test-
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versions of the sport and has undertaken preliminary research into the skills and

equipment required. Given this, I would say that insofar as climbing is an ideal he is
striving toward, this individual was approximately honest in his presentation of himself
as a “climber.” In Aristotelian terms, one might say he was attempting to become a

climber by practicing (as best he could, given his level of experience) the actions
associated with climbing. My account of approximate honesty owes much to Aristotle’s
description of the way humans achieve arete. As Aristotle explains in the Nicomachean
Ethics, virtues are good habits formed through accumulated action practiced over time.
Since moral virtues are not present at birth but must be developed through effort, first we
identify an ideal—a model person who embodies the virtue we wish to emulate—and
then through deliberate and consistent acts of choice we attempt to imitate the virtuous
action until it becomes for us a natural, habituated way of being. In the early stages of
this process, it may seem as if you are engaging in a kind of deception. You may know,
for instance, that your generous act of giving your time to help another student is a choice
you made, despite not feeling particularly inclined toward generosity at the moment.
Initially, your actions may seem forced or faked; in fact, the quip “fake it till you make
it,” is a phrase in common parlance that captures this sense that our earliest efforts may
appear false.

Imagine someone who finds, through casual but repeated choices to have a
cigarette with others, that they increasingly behave as if they are addicted to nicotine. For
example, they notice cravings for a cigarette which occur outside the normal social

context wherein this habit first emerged; instead of bumming a smoke off whomever
happens to be around, they have begun to purchase and smoke their own; what was once
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an occasional indulgence now feels more necessary and urgent. Now imagine this person

is aware of these changes and views them with growing disapproval, yet so far, they have
not made a motion to curb this new habit. Let’s say that recently our new smoker has
become friends with someone they admire and respect, and through conversations about

healthy living, virtuous and vicious habits and choices, it becomes clear to our smoker
that the new friend would certainly view habitual smoking as unhealthy, unpleasant, and
probably vicious. One evening at a party, the two friends are standing together when
someone offering a cigarette, asks “Do you smoke?” In the moment, under the influence
of their own best judgement, aided now by the presence of the friend who has no reason
to expect otherwise, our new smoker discovers they have finally found the motivation to
begin to be better, to prioritize health, to be otherwise than they currently are. The
response? “No. Thank you.”
Now there is a sense in which the reply here is neither a true statement (given the
specific question asked), nor is it an accurate reflection of our smoker’s current status.
One can imagine the surprise and confusion of an onlooker who happened to be a recent
smoking buddy: “That’s a lie. You do smoke!” I mention this hypothetical situation as an
example of how, in the context of friendship, one might have made available to them new
opportunities to be something different than they currently are. In such a case, at least in

its burgeoning form, this statement is still a misrepresentation of facts (strictly construed),
but it may yet prove to be a beautiful lie. If, moving forward, our smoker exercises the
determination required to make actual the claim being advanced, then we might say

instead that what was offered here was not a lie, but rather a bold new truth made
possible through hope and a crucial element of active resolve. To the smoker, the “lie”
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presents itself as a possibility. The internal dialogue of the moment may run thus: “Am I

a smoker? Is that what I have become, what I will continue choosing to be? No.” Here the
lie represents an active decision to change. Striving toward. Not yet, but on the way to
becoming. Practicing. Walking the path.

The challenge, of course, is how best to apply the concept of approximate honesty
to virtue friendships in such a way that the “approximations” enrich and benefit rather
than detract from or weaken the relationship. We have already discussed some of the
conditions that best accommodate a thriving generative friendship. The first has to do
with distance. Emerson makes a compelling case for the reasoning behind maintaining a
degree of separation from those with whom we wish to correspond on an intellectual and
spiritual level. To know our friend’s aesthetic tastes and academic interests, to understand
their values and aspirations is far more intimate than knowing where they dined for lunch
on Thursday or their plans for next week. Part of what makes an online relationship an
ideal candidate for an intellectual partnership is the built-in separation that makes
focusing on ideas more natural.
Earlier, in discussing the benefits of online friendship, Adam Briggle considers a
relationship that develops between a teacher and a soldier as they exchange letters over
the course of several months. Due to the distance separating them, Briggle suggests each

is more open and honest with the other, sharing information they may feel uncomfortable
revealing to people in their daily lives. While Briggle demonstrates how distance can
increase what I have called strict honesty, I would like to consider how approximate

honesty might also play an important role in a such a friendship; specifically, I want to
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look at how approximate honesty might assist in generating courage in one or both

correspondents.
As the soldier relays thoughts and feelings he experiences as his company
prepares to engage in conflict, and as he describes details of those events in letters, the

schoolteacher reacts as one unaccustomed to life on the front lines of war. To the
teacher, the sense of calm resolve communicated through the soldier’s words seems
remarkably courageous, and in his response back to the soldier, he says as much, praising
the soldier for his courage. Knowing now that his friend holds him in such high esteem,
the soldier finds he begins thinking of himself as courageous; at the same time, he also
discovers new motivation to practice small acts of courage. Eventually, he may even
choose to undertake more difficult tasks which would require even greater courage—
volunteering, perhaps, for a reconnaissance mission.
But what if, in his portrayal of himself in the letters, the soldier put on a braver
face than how he actually felt? What if his choice of words and the details he mentions
were selected to represent the situation (his views, feelings or actions) in the best possible
light? What if in the letters to his friend he depicts the response he would, ideally, hope
for himself, the one to which he aspires? Such cases, I have argued, have a place within
character friendships as, under the right conditions, they can generate a positive feedback

loop that produces favorable conditions for growth—in this case for moral development.
The opportunity for moral growth extends to the other friend as well. Not only is it the
case that the soldier benefits from the idealized notion of himself (which was partially

cultivated by his portrayal of himself, but was also taken up and enhanced by his friend),
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the teacher, too, is engaged in the same mutually exchanged process of self-

representation/self-cultivation and therefore enjoys similar opportunities for growth 6.
A second condition that helps create a healthy generative friendship has to do
with motives. For generative friendships to thrive, intention is paramount. If I were to

name the essence of what separates approximate honesty from vicious misrepresentation,
it would be intent. In speaking of creative, intellectual and moral aspirations with your
friend, one must be committed to the project of realizing the ideal with a sincere desire to
eventually embody the character trait, rather than simply keeping up a ruse. The goal,
after all is esse quam videri— to be rather than to seem.

1.6

Objections and Conclusion

Certainly there are limits to this approach. One should never attempt to pass
oneself off as having special expertise—professional or otherwise—most critically in
high-stakes situations. Had my friend taken his pose as a rock climber to the next level
and pretended he had experience belaying, for instance, and had he and his newfound
friend decided to tackle a climb at Red River Gorge, both would incur substantial risk.
Similarly, a pilot, a surgeon, a mental health specialist—without knowledge and proven
expertise in these fields one should never attempt to fake or exaggerate credentials. These
are just a few examples, to which common sense will readily supply more.

Briggle speculates that, in response to the soldier’s correspondence, the teacher might come to reevaluate
himself. He then “faces his daily chores with a greater resolve and begins to appreciate more the simple
things of a life at peace” (74). Although Briggle’s example assumes what I’ve called strict honesty, one
could expect similar results with approximate honesty as well.
6
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In addition to needing to respect limits on the kinds of claims that can serve as

appropriate “approximations,” some may object to projecting an idealized version of
yourself to others because of the potential for creating pressure to be or become
something you are not (yet). If the high standards set expectations that generate anxiety

about being “found out” (imposter syndrome) or failing at whatever goal has been set as
the target, rather than generating the motivation to reach those goals, then the potential
good of setting the standards has been undermined.
Another obstacle might be the draw of wanting to “close the distance”—that is, to
have a “real” (physical, embodied) relationship with your online friend. If Aristotle is
correct that what friends desire most of all is being together, then the likelihood this
would arise is substantial. The question then becomes: if online friends choose to spend
time together in person, do they risk losing or perhaps spoiling the special nature of the
relationship? Is Emerson correct in asserting that “the very flower and aroma of the
flower of each of the beautiful natures disappears as they approach each other”
(“Friendship”)?
Lastly, and most importantly, some may complain that the approximate honesty
described here amounts to little more than an admission that the relationship is ultimately
“predicated upon a lie.” I find this to be most serious objection, although it is not without

qualification and a remedy which I think mitigates this concern. Michael T. McFall has
expressed concern that long-distance friends who rely on mediated correspondence (text
based; whether online or traditional written) for communication have “no idea whether

their respective sharing is genuine” (228). “There could be,” he worries, “a large
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distance between what is written and what is true. People often lie, and they might even

unknowingly convey falsehoods” (228).
Surely, even under the parameters I have suggested here, the virtue of honesty is
not without relevance. As mentioned earlier, the objective in approximating truth through

an idealized lens of how things might be is to expand the way we look at representations
to include an option for aesthetic interpretation. Such interpretations do not disregard
honesty, nor do they discount virtue. After all, I am suggesting making honest
approximations that both respect boundaries and aspire toward truth. This is hardly the
egregious deception some fear. We find a useful model in revisiting the way Aristotle
fleshes out his discussion of anger and the associated virtue, mildness. “It is hard to
define,” he says, “how, against whom, about what and how long we should be angry”
(NE IV.5). Likewise, the capacity to be truthful is a virtue subject to the particulars of a
given situation, where proper consideration requires determining how one might be
honest “‘at the right times,’ in the right way, to the right persons and in the right degree”
(qtd in Vallor).
While the concern motivating Cocking and Matthews’ objection to the highly
curated presentation of virtual selves in online friendships is legitimate for many cases, in
the context of generative friendship, some of the things they view as potential problems

can be seen as opportunities instead. Rather than seeing the “high level of control and
choice” available in how one presents themselves to a friend in a negative light, with
generative friendship this aspect can be viewed as a strength. After all, generally

speaking, being able to produce “much more careful and thought-out responses to
questions” would be considered a good thing. Most writing benefits from the writer
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taking time to develop ideas (one can gather thoughts, research relevant material, map out

the best way to convey information); moreover, written expression often improves with
effort and attention, (one is able to craft more beautiful phrases; use more expressive
language; present ideas more precisely, more concretely). The same can be said of virtual

communication.
It is important to keep in mind here that approximate honesty in the context of
generative friendship does not involve lying in the sense of being duplicitous, or even
conjuring a whole-scale misrepresentation of oneself. Instead, a generative friendship is
an intellectual partnership where two people engage in creating and nurturing an elevated
sense of themselves and one another that is presented “in a light better than any light that
ever shone”—not in the sense of something whose value has been mistaken or
overestimated, but in the way holding a high estimation of something has the potential to
elevate it to the next level—to a form Edward Burne-Jones might recognize and call
divinely beautiful.
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CHAPTER 2. LOVE AS NARRATIVE

2.1

Introduction

One of the most interesting discussions in recent scholarship on love involves a
question concerning what we are attracted to when we love someone. In seeking to
understand this, philosophers have offered a variety of answers; some quite specific,
others broad-ranging and inclusive. Of these, the properties view has proved influential
due in part to its intuitive appeal. As Simon Keller explains, the properties view “says
that the question, ‘What justifies your choosing to make her the object of your romantic
love?’ is a sensible question to ask, and that . . . lovers can, in principle, answer it by
appealing to a set of the beloved’s properties” (164).
In what follows I will consider some of the pros and cons generally associated

with the properties view, noting especially some recent attempts to reconcile it with
common objections. Although each attempt to amend the view has yielded additional
insights, so far none of these defenses succeeds in capturing the essence of love without

also generating issues of its own. Part of the reason this is so is because the methodology
philosophers have employed thus far overwhelmingly focuses on abstract analysis aimed
at breaking a concept apart into its component elements. While analysis excels at

identifying essential features and clarifying the particulars of concepts, it generally falls
short when it comes to showing how these particulars fit together as a whole—which is
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an equally important part of understanding. In an attempt to reconcile competing views

on the nature of love—seemingly at an impasse—this essay suggests viewing love in
narrative terms as a way to bring these views together.

2.2

Advantages of the Properties View

As philosophers, we value objectivity; we want our thinking to be guided by

reasoning that is logically sound and defensible, and ideally, we expect our actions to
respond to these reasons. It is no surprise then, that in considering love—this state that
plays such a central role in our lives—we often apply the same standard. We look for
reasons in love because we want the things we do because of love to be ordered and
rational, to make sense—or at the very least not be irrational. Of course, there are notable
exceptions to this generalization, even amongst those who defend some version of the
properties view. Robert Solomon, for instance, rejects the ideals of “objectivity,
impersonality, disinterestedness, universality, respect for evidence and arguments, and so
on” as being operative in love, and yet still maintains that love has reasons and that those
reasons are linked to the properties of the beloved (Erotic Love 502). Additionally,
Laurence Thomas argues that love can be “explained” but not “justified” through
reference to reasons, thus allowing love to be freed from some problematic implications
of objectivity in the sphere of love, namely: avoiding the conclusion that there could be
reasons for love which would compel us to either love or reject someone.
Besides the commitment to rationality as an intellectual ideal, we want love to
have reasons in part because love is so risky; a lot is at stake, emotionally speaking, if
you make a mistake in love. Motivated by such a concern, Derek Edyvane has argued
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that love should be answerable to external critique; the reasons I give for loving my

beloved must be concrete and open to an evaluation of their merits. Because of this
requirement, reasons need to refer to specific features, rather than vague proclamations
such as “I love him—entirely—just him.” Edyvane makes his point within the context of

a more detailed argument about unconditional love, concluding that romantic love, at
least, is best viewed as a conditional commitment which “takes into consideration the
reasons we might be able to offer to render our commitment intelligible to others” and
also, I might add, to ourselves (59).
The first advantage, then, of the properties view is that it provides an account of
love’s reasons. What are the reasons for my loving someone? To address this question, I
would turn to observation and evaluation of the beloved, noting qualities, traits, or
features I value or find desirable, and which are also possessed by my beloved. These
properties, in principle7, provide me with reasons for loving. Now, let’s take a moment to
consider a basic version of the competing view, so that we can contrast the two. The
alternate approach to the properties view claims that what I am attracted to and what I
ultimately love8 is you: the whole person, the total ‘self’ of my beloved. As appealing as
this initially sounds, one might well ask, “What does it mean to love the entirety of
another person?” and “What, exactly, is the ‘self’ to which we would be appealing by

making such a claim?” Solomon, at least, finds such notions ridiculous: “The idea that the
object of my love is another person suggests . . . that love is about a person simpliciter,
the whole person, nothing but and nothing less than the whole person. This is simply

7

I follow Keller here in qualifying this statement in order to acknowledge the possibility that one does not
always know precisely which properties one is responding to.
8
These two should probably be separated. More on this issue later.
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untrue” (Love 133). He continues by suggesting a hypothetical list such as one might

produce when asked about a particular object of love: “I love you,” he says, “but that may
be for any number of reasons—because I think you’re beautiful, because you love me
too, because I admire you in your career, because we cook fine meals together” (133).

His main argument in this passage is that we neither love with our own ‘entire self,’ nor
do we love another’s ‘entire self,’ instead our loving only makes sense within the context
of what he calls a loveworld—the mutually created realm wherein we, as lovers, enact a
new shared identity.
Now the point I want to bring out here, that Solomon serves to illustrate, is simply
that in practice, when asked to provide an account of our reasons for love, more often
than not we cite the admirable properties of the beloved. Moreover, a lover who cannot
(does not? will not?) name at least some features of his beloved as reasons for his
attraction is at risk of seeming lazy, apathetic, or at best, evasive, for his failure to engage
in this exercise. Indeed, citing anything other than specific properties attributable to the
beloved, in some sense, would seem vacuous. To extend this same observation, there is
also a sense in which we conceive of ourselves as describable most readily in terms of
what we consider our own set of properties. For example, in responding to the request,
“Tell me about yourself,” we almost always appeal to concrete properties such as

physical features (I’m 5’9”) and personality traits (I’m a bit shy), as well as things we
have done (I’ve hiked 350 miles of the Appalachian Trail). This offers fairly persuasive
support to the intuition that we tend to think even of ourselves, at least broadly, in terms

of properties. What’s important here is that no one, in answering that question, would say
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something like “I am an ineffable underlying essence, a total self.” At least it would

certainly seem odd if they did.
This brings up another issue. Absent any meaningful explanation of what is meant
by loving a whole self, it seems we must love the beloved as an instantiation of actual

traits, qualities, and properties; otherwise, lacking any particular feature(s) that would
enable us to distinguish the ones we love from others, we would end up having to admit
that love is arbitrary. After all, if my beloved’s properties do not pick her out, then what
does? What would be the basis for love, or would we have to say that love has no
reasons?
We want there to be reasons. There’s definitely a sense in which we want to be
loved for at least some of our properties, especially if we consider these properties to be
essential to, or definitive of, our own sense of self. This is particularly true when we
consider the traits in question to be personal achievements, things we have striven for—
whether this is a non-moral good such as maintaining a healthy body through
conscientious eating habits and exercise, or a moral good such as the virtue of generosity.
In each case, the featured good is one we have made a conscious effort to cultivate, and it
is not unreasonable to want the struggle involved in its achievement to be recognized and
appreciated—to have the work we have invested time and energy into to be

acknowledged—as belonging to us, as our own.
But not only this. Another situation where we might wish to have a certain
feature picked out by our lovers and viewed as inhering in us is when we deem a property

valuable—worthy of our esteem—and we want that property associated with us. Here it
need not matter whether the trait in question is possessed “naturally” (according to
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disposition), or a trait we have acquired because of good upbringing or education, or even

a trait we possess by chance (by luck of the genetic draw, for example, a person may be
athletic or a gifted metaphysician), as long as the trait selected is one we value, and as
long as we can attach this trait to us as an applicable descriptor, then we are apt to be

disappointed to find out that our beloved is indifferent toward (unresponsive to) this
quality—that she would have loved us in the same way even if we had been otherwise is
no consolation. In this case it seems what is at stake (in addition to the arbitrariness
mentioned earlier) is the fact that we want our lovers to appreciate what we take to be our
positive properties, largely because we hope they too will value what we value.
Simon Keller has argued that when someone loves us it gives us reason to feel
good about ourselves (perhaps most especially, I might add, when we are loved for traits
we value). His claim serves to reinforce much of what I have been describing above.
Here is Keller:
A large part of what we value about being the object of another’s love is that we
take it to imply an informed and positive (at least not negative), objective
evaluation of our character, we think of love as being more than the arbitrary
expression of a subjective whim. We want to know that there exist reasons that
can render this person’s love for us intelligible to others. Where a person’s

declaration of love appears to lack this element of implicit objective evaluation,
where it strikes us as being in this sense indiscriminate, we feel that it means less.
(72)

To sum up what seems right about the properties view, the following should be
mentioned: we want love to have reasons and properties supply reasons; if we are not
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loved for our properties, it is unclear what motivates love; as a result, love may seem

arbitrary or indiscriminate; being loved for properties importantly locates value in us as
bearers of valued properties.

2.3

Downsides of the Properties View

I will begin by explaining an objection to the properties view that has intuitive

appeal, mainly because it carries so much emotional and psychological weight. Speaking
directly to our personal insecurities, this objection asks, “If someone loves me because of
certain properties I possess, then what happens to that love if/when I change?” This
objection is particularly powerful because of the inevitability of the condition it
addresses. The question is not so much whether I will change, but when and how, and to
what extent will these changes impact my lover’s regard for me? For this reason, the
objection has the potential to be one that could plague with perpetual worry. Expressing
this problem, Derek Edyvane says,
It is somewhat offensive, objectionably contractual and dispassionate to suggest
that one will love, but only so long as the beloved retains her youthful appearance,
her sense of humor, his easy-going demeanour [sic] or his impeccable hygiene. Of
course we hope that our beloved will retain the qualities we adore in him or her,
but it seems rather unforgiving to suggest that we shall only love so long as he or
she does. (59)
What makes us uncomfortable, it seems, is the fickleness of such love. Taken from a
slightly different angle, however, the same basic issue (the question of love’s
changeability) can generate an entirely different set of concerns. It is often in response to
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this fear of love altering with alteration 9 that unconditional love is extolled as an ideal.

And yet, coming from a standpoint generally sympathetic to the properties account, both
Edyvane and Keller argue against unconditional love. Better to have love be responsive
to properties than settle for a love which would give us no reason to value ourselves. So

the solution to the issue we found objectionable (i.e. fickleness is objectionable,
unconditional love the solution) is the very thing we must reject to in order to preserve
what’s valuable in the properties view. The fact that this cuts both ways—or either way
perhaps—seems like a problem.
To further complicate things, even though in theory we tend to hold up
unconditional love as an ideal, in practice, it’s fairly common for significant features of
the beloved to change and for us, nonetheless, to continue to love. Now this may seem to
be a good thing. After all, “constancy” (Niko Kolodny’s term for this feature) in love
saves us from the disparaging charge of fickleness. But can we think of cases where
constancy might not be so grand? Consider instances where an individual loves someone
and that person changes for the worse—say the beloved turns abusive or becomes
indifferent to his partner. If still, even in the face of such radical and destructive changes
in the beloved, the lover continues to love, then we would be tempted to call this love not
just constant, but perhaps even “stubborn” or “foolhardy” (Edyvane 60).

Now on a standard reading of the properties view, it would seem that in cases like
the one mentioned above, alteration in the properties of the beloved would cause
alteration in the love as well (remember: properties are supposed to be reasons for love),

This reference to Shakespeare’s “Love is not love which alters when alteration finds” is a favorite among
those writing on this topic, as are references to Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s sonnet 43: “How do I love
thee, let me count the ways.” Hard to resist.
9
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but as Kolodny rightly points out, in plenty of relationships, such alteration in love never

occurs (sometimes for ostensibly good reasons, sometimes not so good). Either way, the
puzzling issue here, as Kolodny notes, is that in cases like this, “The quality view seems
to imply that love cannot be responsive to its own reasons” (140).

Another major objection to the properties view concerns the issue of
replaceability. If love can be understood as an attraction to the properties of the beloved,
presuming these properties are identifiable, then it seems to follow that if one could
locate another person who has the same attractive features as the beloved, the lover could,
without issue, substitute this new person in as a replacement. Further, I see nothing
preventing the lover from taking on ever more objects of love, as she continues to
encounter individuals who express the properties she finds desirable. Viewed another
way, suppose I compose a list of the properties I find attractive (difficult not to think of
the proliferation of online dating sites here); now armed with that list, it would seem
anyone (even a computer) could go out into the world, find suitable matches for the
properties I seek, and return to me with any number of candidates for my love. If
properties truly provide reasons for love, as they purport, would it then be irrational of
me to fail to love any one—or for that matter all—of these candidates? Not only are the
implications here counter-intuitive, they fly in the face of our actual lived experiences.

Finally, one might complain that the properties view, with its emphasis on
objectively identifying features in the loved one is just “too cerebral” to plausibly explain
the phenomenon of love (Keller 165). Love, we believe, is mysterious, somewhat

inexplicable, and probably not subject to the same sort of evaluation we might apply
elsewhere—at least not entirely. Moreover, focusing on the properties of one’s beloved,
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even when picking out laudable features, can seem impersonal—dangerously close to

loving the properties rather than the person.

2.4

Modifications

If the original question of the properties view asks, “Can love be understood as an
attraction to the qualities of the beloved?” As a tentative answer, I will say “No, I do not

think love can be adequately understood as an attraction to the properties of the beloved.”
At least some forms of love (most notably, familial love) do not in any way seem
motivated by an attraction to properties. But even if we limit our scope to eros/romantic
love, I find the weight of the objections leveled against this view is persuasive enough to
be a hindrance to any straightforward acceptance of the account. Nonetheless, the
fundamental appeal of the properties view remains: it is the strong intuition that when it
comes to love, the beloved is not simply chosen at random, nor are we attracted willynilly to just anyone. In fact, if anything, the opposite is true. In actuality we are quite
selective in our loving. Also, it seems disingenuous to deny being attracted to the
properties of the beloved. Surely the features of the beloved play some role in our loving.
The question, then, is: How can we preserve what is essentially true about the properties
view without offending other powerfully held intuitions?
In defending against objections, several modifications to the property view have
been considered. Taking each of the above-mentioned objections in turn, I will describe
and evaluate some of these responses. We begin with the problem of changeability. Will
my lover still love me even when I change? Edyvane and Keller, arguing in support of
love as conditionally given, would both reply, “Well, it depends.” One strength of the
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properties view is that it allows individuals to respond to radical changes in the loved

one’s character, sometimes, by ceasing to love them. I am reminded of Aristotle’s
discussion of this topic as it applies to philia in Book IX of the Nicomachean Ethics: “But
if we accept a friend as a good person, and he becomes vicious, and seems so, should we

still love him? Surely we cannot, if not everything, but only the good is lovable. The bad
is not lovable, and must not be loved” (341). For Aristotle, that was the easy question, of
course we cannot love vice. The only issues he saw left to work out involved whether you
should reject the friend right away or attempt to redeem him; and then, how patient
should you be in your efforts.
Now, none of these philosophers are advocating for a rejection of the beloved
based on trivial or superficial changes, but it seems as if without some additional
elements added to the account, if you can reject the beloved for becoming vicious, why
not allow rejection for any sort of change? Here is where I think a distinction in types of
love would be most useful.10 For instance, in a case where the beloved has become
hopelessly untrustworthy (an alcoholic perhaps?) the lover might find she no longer loves
(erai) her partner, and yet still she maintains some level of affection (storge) because of
the time they have spent together.
Making an appeal to the history of a love relationship is a strategy that has been

employed in attempts to reconcile both the problem of changeability and the substitution
(replaceability) problem. In terms of changeability, one might salvage the properties view
by appealing to a more nuanced model. Rather than being attracted to and valuing the

10

Aristotle achieves this through distinguishing three types of friendships. Turns out, you can end a
friendship if your friend is no longer funny…as long as it was mutually understood that the relationship
was a friendship based on pleasure.
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personal attributes of the beloved, according to Kolodny’s relationship theory, the lover

values his relationship with the beloved. Because the love is defined by relational
aspects, it can more easily accommodate changes in either the lover or the beloved:
“one’s reason for loving a person is one’s relationship to her: the ongoing history that one

shares with her” (136). The problem with this theory, I think, is that it fails to provide any
explanatory account of the initial attraction to a person. Even if relationships provide
reasons for loving (and I believe they do), we seem only able to avail ourselves of this
account after the fact—that is after something resembling love has already taken root.
Prior to this, no relationship existed, so we would still need something like properties to
explain why the lover picked out this particular subject for his love.
Perhaps the solution to this lies in separating attraction from loving. By
considering these two states as different phenomena, we may come closer to
understanding how it can be the case that we respond both to the properties in a person
and to the person himself. For it seems in some way each must be true. If attraction and
loving are answerable to different sorts of motivations and reasons, then we might be able
to avoid problems like changeability and substitutability. As an illustration, Kolodny’s
relationship theory might be strengthened if he could appeal to a phenomenology of
attraction that in some way responds to features in the beloved. Of course, a well-

developed account of attraction would need to consider both the initial encounter with the
beloved and attraction as an on-going process as well. Features that initially capture
attention are not always the ones that keep people together; each new experience with the

beloved is an opportunity to discover new reasons for attraction that may serve to sustain
it and as these reasons accumulate over time, we can eventually make sense of talk about
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“relational loving” or “shared history” or perhaps even loving the beloved herself. In

“Love’s Bond,” Robert Nozick nicely summarizes the idea behind what I have suggested
here: “You can fall in love with someone because of certain characteristics and you can
continue to delight in these, but eventually you must love the person himself, and not for

the characteristics, not, at any rate, for any delimited list of them.” (422)
The list. The replaceability problem begins here, with the notion that if love is
based on properties, in principle, any person who manifests the desired features could
stand in just as well as a substitute for the beloved. I said earlier that the “appeal to
history” modification has been applied in response to both changeability and this
objection as well. The idea here is that even if we could locate a perfect match for the
features on my list of desired properties, this identical twin could never actually be
identical to my beloved because of the “unique contribution [my beloved] has made to
the narrative of my life” (Edyvane 63). I accept this as a legitimate point; certainly
referring to a matrix of conversations, shared activities, a particular kind of influence the
beloved has exerted over the lover’s thoughts, all serves the intended function of
distinguishing the beloved as unique (and therefore not perfectly replaceable with
another). However, there may be a potential downside to this.
Imagine two people: my beloved and his identical-properties-twin. As an adherent

of the properties view, faced with this choice, I am at a loss as to whom I should love
(identical-properties-twin, after all, seems quite appealing. Should I replace my beloved
with twin or perhaps love them both?). Thinking about these two excellent candidates, I

suddenly remember that I do have a way to distinguish my beloved from his twin—I can
make note of our shared history together. This exercise, however, turns up some
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disappointing material: we fight a lot; perhaps we take boring vacations; there is that time

he forgot our anniversary… Armed with the revelation afforded me by examining the
unique contribution my beloved has made to the narrative of my life, I decide to give
identical-properties-twin a try. I doubt this is how advocates of the shared history view

planned for this to end. My point is merely to call attention to the underlying assumption
that a shared history with someone provides a positive reason to love them. As the
example above demonstrates, this is not necessarily the case.
Finally, the concern that the properties view ultimately suggests a love of
properties rather than persons is worth addressing, even though I think we are already
equipped with resources to handle the objection. Earlier I suggested that a more nuanced
account of what might be called the trajectory of love seemed like a promising place to
look for resolution to some common problems facing the properties view. I wondered
whether considering attraction and loving as having different, but overlapping and
integrated objects and aims, and if attempting to trace the development (and integration)
of these two states over time would help clarify these problematic issues. At the
beginning of this section I said that I did not think love could be adequately understood as
an attraction to the properties of the beloved. I still believe that. Although the properties
view describes an essential aspect of love, by itself, it is incomplete.

2.5

A Narrative Approach

In the simplest terms, a narrative is a story. More specifically, Robert Roberts
defines narrative as “a verbal account (oral or written) of a temporally connected series of
events, including mental events (for example, plans, assessments, emotions) and actions,
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including speech acts.” Regarding these events, Roberts elaborates; narrative “shows

connections (continuities, changes, antecedents and consequences) between the past, the
present, and the future. It depicts characters, in their continuities and changes, through
depiction of their actions, interactions, and reactions (for example emotions), their

thoughts, desires and intentions at different points in time.” In general, narrative is a
fundamental way humans make sense of information. By collecting observations and
noting sequences, patterns and themes, the brain pieces together separate aspects of
various phenomena and then weaves them into a structure that makes sense (“Narrative
Ethics”).
Among philosophers, the narrative approach has made considerable inroads in the
field of applied ethics. This is especially the case in medical ethics, where philosophers
are keen to apply narratives to help patients and caregivers make sense of issues
surrounding illness and death. Judging from the number of journal articles written on this
topic over the past five years, a new subset of narrative ethics seems to be emerging.
Additionally, interest in narrative is crossing over into the realm of (theoretical)
normative ethics as well. In her book Love’s Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum takes up the
topic, arguing that a “coordination between philosophical and narrative presentations of
the virtues and vices is needed.”

In his 2012 article “Narrative Ethics,” Robert Roberts explains how philosophical
analysis and literary description each have strong suits—areas of expertise wherein they
excel— and he suggests that by working in tandem, these two approaches can generate a

more complete and insightful whole: “Some of the best literature displays moral (and
immoral) character in richer ways than philosophy alone has resources to do, but
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philosophy brings to its description a schematic precision that narrative alone cannot

supply” (“Narrative Ethics”). Roberts’ own article focuses on the intersection between
the theoretical framework of virtue ethics and literary narratives. He considers several
passages in works by Jane Austen, Henry James and George Eliot where characters are

astutely described by the author in ways that illuminate important features of the moral
life, including virtuous and vicious behaviors. Roberts believes that examination of
insightfully composed descriptions such as these can serve to ground otherwise abstract
ethical theories and provide an effective tool philosophers can use to convey ideas to
readers, thus enabling them to better translate such knowledge into ethical practice.
In the same way narrative has been useful in revealing points of intersection
among ideas that seem unrelated or even at odds with one another in the fields of medical
ethics and virtue ethics, I think applying a narrative approach to the analysis of love
offers several advantages. What happens if instead of trying to abstract and analyze
various aspects of love in isolation—attempts to define love, for example, or to locate
precisely the features we are attracted to when we love someone—we consider ways in
which the phenomenon of love functions as a narrative whole? Will this help show how
separate, seemingly unrelated pieces fit together?
The primary advantage of viewing love as a narrative is the unification of

competing explanatory theories. While each of the ways of analyzing love have
something legitimate to offer, as stand-alone theories they are inadequate. In what
follows I want to show how various analytical approaches considered previously in the

essay are not fundamentally in conflict with one another—one is not wrong while the
other is right—instead, they have each accurately described different aspects of the
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phenomenon of love. Viewing love in narrative terms pushes back against the reductivist

tendencies of some analytical methods and provides a way to conceive of the some of the
features of love in continuity with one another. Ideally, this approach has the added virtue
of more accurately reflecting our lived experience.

2.6

Love as a Narrative

Even though there are innumerable ways to tell a story, generally speaking stories
share common features, like structural patterns (exposition-rising action-climax-falling
action-denouement), devices (narrator, conflict, symbolism), and components (character,
setting, theme). In this section, we will consider several traditional narrative elements
and how they might fit into and enhance existing theories of love, with special attention
given to the properties view and modifications it has precipitated.
2.6.1

Plot

The plot—or temporal sequence of events that comprises the action of the story—

provides the essential structure of a story and enables the audience to locate, trace and
contextualize events as they are experienced by characters over time. Viewing a love
relationship in terms of a narrative arc developed through a series of actions, thoughts,

emotions, and motivations unfolding within the context of an overarching storyline offers
insight into the history of the relationship—how it began, developed, weathered
challenges, grew in intimacy or deteriorated and declined. Not all plots progress in a

linear fashion (Evelyn Waugh’s novel Brideshead Revisited opens with Charles Ryder
narrating as a middle-aged man reflecting on the experiences of his youth in Oxford and
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concludes with a return to the ‘present day’); nonetheless, picking out certain

chronological markers can provide a framework through which to conceptualize
relationships.
For instance, identifying an important event that serves as the initial contact

between two people, the pre-meeting reference to someone, or an overheard conversation
which sets the stage for an eventual interchange—these ‘first encounters’ and the followup sequence it generates make up what might be called the Beginning of a relationship.
In order to understand Charles’ relationship with Julia Flyte—their troubled first goround at love, an extramarital affair when they are reunited after a lengthy separation,
their attempt to forge a committed long-term union—one must piece together an account
of a middle-class young man who is intrigued by a school mate’s flamboyant charisma
and who is drawn into a decades-long entanglement with a wealthy Catholic family. This
love story begins, oddly enough, when Julia’s brother Sebastian vomits into a ground
floor window of Charles’ room.
The properties that first attract Charles to Sebastian (and vice versa), such as
personality traits and dispositions, contribute to a meaningful account of the subsequent
intimacy that develops between them. But so do their interactions with other characters,
and details from the family history of each. As we come to understand these past

experiences and add them to the growing number of situations we can observe, we move
toward a more comprehensive account of how an erotically charged friendship develops
into an eventual love affair with Sebastian’s sister Julia. In a narrative framework, this is

the Middle or developmental period of the love story that depicts the relationship growing
and altering as a “shared history” takes form. This continues through cycles of crisis and
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resolution as we near the climax or narrative End, which may materialize as a failed

relationship, or death, or perhaps with the suggestion of perpetuation—a cycling back to
the beginning, or hints that some aspect of the relationship continues on though offspring
(in the form of children, or accomplishments, or a look at those impacted by the legacy of

the union). Thus, viewing love as a complex relationship unfolding within a narrative plot
sequence combines elements from both the properties view and also the relational/shared
history view.
2.6.2

Character

In any story, characters play a central role; they are the figures around whom the
events of the story unfold. Whether they are active agents, moving, gesturing, and
performing deeds, or passive recipients who experience consequences initiated by others,
without characters there would be no story to relate. In the case of a love narrative,

thinking of the lover and the beloved (minimally) as characters who are themselves
individuals with unique personal histories, intellectual and emotional backgrounds,
learned and dispositional behavioral patterns, and skill sets—in addition to an extensive

list of physical attributes—provides a starting place for understanding both the nature of
attraction and the reasons that animate action as it unfolds throughout the course of a
relationship. Already we can see how analytical attempts to define love as an attraction
to properties, and then isolate it from the complex ways in which these individuals as
characters can generate a shared life together can misfire. Recall that within the context
of abstract analytical reasoning, the above options are presented as opposing views.
When two people meet and take an interest in one another, they have a natural
desire to increase their knowledge of the other. Commonly this takes the form of
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exchanging personal histories. In Sheldon Vanauken’s book A Severe Mercy, the couple

in the story take this notion to an extreme. So intent are Davy and Van—two young
people who meet and fall in love—to know and understand one another that they make
lists of all the books they have read and places they visited before they met. Lists in hand,

they decide to go back and experience these things together, with the ultimate goal being
to create, as much as possible, a sense of shared history which they hope will stand as a
“shining barrier” between themselves (in the form of this new, unified entity) and the
outside world. This autobiographical account of Vanauken’s marriage to Jean Davis is a
good example of the relational view of love Niko Kolodny advocates for.
But as mentioned earlier, the accumulated experiences that comprise who we are
as persons, as characters—including childhood adventures and mishaps, stories told
about you by family members and friends—when taken into consideration, these subnarratives help account for various likes and dislikes, confidences and insecurities, and
strengths and weaknesses. Such information, when disclosed (whether “read” off of us by
others’ observations, or deliberately revealed) plays a role in the phenomenon of
attraction in a way that is different from the ongoing, developmental quality of a
relationship.
To take this a step further: even though observing a person’s actions does provide

some information about qualities they possess, the actions themselves are manifestations
of something deeper within. As such, observing a person’s actions over time (what might
be called the narrative advantage) leads to accumulated knowledge, and with it a much

deeper understanding of that person as a person, rather than a series of isolated or
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disconnected actions. A list of properties alone—however long—can never fully express

a person’s core being.
Julia Flyte is an interesting example of someone whose character arc presents a
series of conflicted actions ultimately tied to the core struggle she experiences. Even

though she loves Charles, he is a professed agnostic, and since she is expected to marry a
Catholic, she makes a hurried match with Rex Mottram who has agreed to convert.
Unsurprisingly, the union is fraught, and Julia eventually violates social and religious
norms by engaging in an affair with Charles. At first, the affair seems to offer Julia an
opportunity to finally be happy: she is reunited with a man she loves; she emancipates
herself from a strained marriage, and at the same time has mapped out a way to escape an
overbearing family dynamic. And yet, at the climax of the story, just as Julia seems
poised to finally break free, she instead chooses to give up her relationship with Charles
and remain at home in order to fulfill what she takes to be her duty to family and religion
(which, in this case are inextricably linked).
An attempt to describe Julia in terms of the properties displayed through her
actions might yield a list of antithetical traits such as rebellious and fiercely independent,
alongside conforming and constrained. Thus, it seems the best way to understand Julia is
to consider the whole—her actions, motivations, and core disposition—as it unfolds over

time within the narrative context of her experiences. On this view, a sense of continuity is
still possible even when changes occur over time (as they will). The various traits one
might associate with Julia’s actions alter—sometimes in surprising ways—as she

navigates her relationship with Charles. Ultimately, viewing someone in terms of
properties alone is undercut by the fact that a person is never exhausted by their actions.
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Here, a narrative framework allows for a sense of openness and offers a more

comprehensive account, because—as Julia’s character arc demonstrates—even radical
change is possible.
2.6.3

Narrator

Just as every story is told from a point of view—whether it be first person, second
person, or a third person omniscient narrator—the story of a particular love will also be
recounted within the context of a given perspective. Considering the fact that no two
people would report details of a series of events in the exact same way, even the selection
process itself is indicative of what the person telling the story finds important. Because of
this, salient features will vary depending on the narrative perspective. Although the
narrator might also be a character in the story, this need not be the case. The most
comprehensive narrative of love would be a multi-perspective story told from at least two

points of view: the lover and the beloved. It is not uncommon in the context of describing
an event—an argument for instance—that the motivations, reasons for action, and
interpretation given by one party to the conflict will differ substantially from the account

as understood and provided by the other. In cases like this, understanding love in terms of
reasons that are concrete and open to an evaluation allows space and distance to weigh
those reasons. One of the factors cited by Derek Edyvane in defense of love being
grounded in reasons (which are themselves based on qualities) is just this: it enables the
account of love to be answerable to external critique.
For as much as Sheldon Vanauken and Jean Davis wished to cordon themselves
off from the rest of the world and live in an exclusive community of their own creation,
this is never entirely possible. Lovers are not the only two characters in the narratives that
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are their lives. When love is viewed as an interconnected whole comprised of multiple,

varying perspectives that sometimes diverge, sometimes converge, and frequently
overlap and intersect one another, these additional narrative perspectives will add
dimension, offer correctives, and (at least in principle) provide an objective outsider’s

view that may offer wisdom and insight otherwise unavailable to those experiencing
events at close range.
2.6.4

Setting

Insofar as location and situational features provide a context under which a story
unfolds, dramatic setting contributes something essential to the meaning of narratives.
The fact that two people first encounter one another while walking alone in a park; that
they continue to pass on subsequent days at around the same time; that they ultimately
begin speaking because of intersecting activity at the park, means that this particular

location plays a central role in the narrative the couple’s shared life. While location itself
is important, other factors associated with place—such as weather, cultural traditions and
pressures, activities available for the couple to engage in, geographical and manmade

features of the landscape, whether the community is urban or rural, crowded or isolated—
help define and conscribe the conditions for meaning within the narrative.
As an example of the way the setting of an event gives rise to meaning within a
particular context, in After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre imagines a man engaging in the
action of tending a garden. If someone were to ask or attempt to explain what he is
“doing,” MacIntyre suggests that a wide variety of answers may be given, all of them true
and plausible within differing contexts. It may be said, for instance, that he is:
“‘Digging,’ ‘Gardening,’ ‘Taking exercise,’ ‘Preparing for winter,’ or ‘Pleasing his wife’
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(206). The kind of answer that would make sense in a given situation is dependent on the

context—or setting—under which the behavior takes place. MacIntyre illustrates this
point by contrasting two contexts: one where it is autumn and the man is checking off
late-season garden chores, and another where his wife wishes he would get out and

exercise more. In one case the man’s action is “situated in an annual cycle of domestic
activity,” where in the other, it occurs within the “narrative history of a marriage” (206).
Each setting carries with it a different set of expectations, motivations and intentions, and
because of this, MacIntyre argues that human actions can only be understood as taking
place within a context: “a setting has a history, a history within which the histories of
individual agents not only are, but have to be, situated, just because without the setting
and its changes through time the history of the individual agent and his changes through
time will be unintelligible” (206-7).
If MacIntyre is correct and the meaning of actions, events, and conversations
alters within the context of the setting, then love cannot be adequately understood apart
from its locatedness within a particular narrative framework. Consider two people who
have known each other since childhood, who may have grown up within close proximity
of one another. Perhaps they rode bicycles on the same streets and romped in the woods
behind the same neighborhood school—these two individuals share a sense of place, a

common history that serves as a framework for later experiences together. Contrast this
with a couple whose initial meeting takes place in a foreign country, far away from their
respective lives. Although their encounter occurs at a time in each of their lives when

they are away from home for the first time, just getting a taste of independence, we can
imagine they might come from radically different family and educational backgrounds,
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be from opposite ends of the country, and hold significantly differing political views, yet

still find common ground upon which to build a relationship. Whatever the elements of a
couple’s story happen to be, it is certain they would have played out differently had they
taken place elsewhere, in an altered context, and under different circumstantial stimuli.
2.6.5

Theme

In literature, themes are main, underlying ideas that get established through
significant actions or events, which are often repeated in varying circumstances
throughout the narrative. Within the context of love, themes might include cycles that get
repeated; issues that reoccur with some regularity, behavior and emotional patterns that
emerge within an array of events one might recount in creating a narrative arc: The
idealist dreamer who conjures grand visions for the practically-minded accomplisher to
hammer out and make possible; The couple who researches and deliberates, endlessly

weighing pros and cons before making decisions, only to find their hesitation frequently
results in missed opportunities; The restless lover who changes jobs and moves to a new
location every couple of years, and the accommodating beloved who is content to follow.

Each of the above vignettes describes a behavioral pattern that could develop over time,
and to the extent that it meaningfully impacts the relationship as such, can be said to be a
theme of that relationship.
In the same way that our actions manifest patterns, speech—including topics of
conversation, use of particular words and phrases and the expression of important ideas—
may as well. It is not unusual in the course of a long-term relationship for partners to feel
a kind of deja vu—as if they have already had a conversation before. Sometimes this
occurs in a positive light, as in recognition of some point of agreement: When a neighbor
53

observes that the Browns haven’t been on vacation in two years— “Yes, precisely. We

always say that having animals ties people down!” Or, the issue may instead be a
recurring point of contention in the relationship, representing an unresolved issue that
resurfaces whenever a particular stimulus is introduced: “The Browns have a new puppy;

it’s so much fun for the kids. Why can’t we get one too? You always say that, but…”
Here ideas (sometimes even exact phrases) from past conversations reemerge and are
recognized as expressing themes that have become significant to the couple’s shared
experience.
While the conversations, actions and events from which themes arise are temporal
episodes in an unfolding plot, the sequence of events is not the same as the themes which
emerge out of it. Even so, one cannot get hold of these themes without simultaneously
considering the narrative sequence within which they are situated. The two are
inextricably linked. Moreover, actions (and conversations, for that matter) are connected
to personal properties—strengths, weaknesses, talents, dispositions—in the same way.
The dreaming of the idealistic planner and her speech describing the features of “the
perfect outdoor concert” arise from her idealistic disposition; in the same way the
hedging, foot-dragging and naysaying of the hesitant person grows out of an overly
cautious personality. None of this happens in isolation, and the interconnectedness of

personality, speech and action are most clearly comprehended through consideration of
the narrative details tying all this together.
Similarly, viewing love as exemplifying themes in the context of an overarching

narrative allows equal weight to be given to the properties view (the lover values the
qualities of the beloved), relationship theory (the lover values his relationship with the
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beloved), and the entire person view (the lover is attracted to the ‘entire self’ of the

beloved) because it makes love intelligible as having grown out of a particular setting,
having developed a set of themes that can be understood only in terms of a relationship
that both comes from a history (the setting) and is evolving through shared activity,

which was initiated, and continues in response to, traits possessed by both the lover and
beloved.

2.7

Conclusion

When seeking to understand the nature of love—this most elusive human
condition—philosophers’ work in attempting to define it concretely and in examining
specific aspects in order to identify essential features has done much to bring us closer to
understanding. At the same time however, when applied to the case of love, these
analytical methods have produced a theoretical stalemate. An adequate account of love
would need to include an acknowledgment of the interconnectedness of the stages and
development of love, the forms it takes, and what it is responding to. Because of this, I
have suggested it may be useful to think of love in narrative terms, and to apply the
conceptual framework—the structure and elements—of storytelling as a way of unifying
diverging theoretical views.
Even so, this approach is subject to certain limitations. For one thing, by its very
nature a holistic account like this is not going to be able to provide precise, analytical
assessments such as formulating a definition of love, or picking out its essential features.
Furthermore, we will not attempt to identify that which would separate narratives of love
from other forms of liking, affinity, or care because the narrative approach propounded
55

here is not intended to apply exclusively to love (even in its many forms). Nearly all

human experience can be framed in terms of narrative structure; this means that this
method could be meaningfully applied toward enterprises as diverse as finding
satisfaction in vocation or work, understanding the role of failure and loss, or tracing how

we construct the notion of family. But the fact that narrative could be used to generate a
more complete understanding of many aspects of human experience is a strength rather
than a weakness of the approach. This suggests, I think, that despite the limitations
mentioned above, there is still a place for narrative as a companion to philosophical
analysis. While argument plays an indispensable role in the work of philosophy aimed at
understanding the nature of love, the holistic view offered by narrative can be used to
resolve some of the competing claims generated through analysis. Thus, rather than
attempting to seek answers using analysis alone, philosophers would do well to
acknowledge that these two approaches should be considered together, as complementary
forms of understanding.
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CHAPTER 3. ATTRACTION AS RECOGNITION: EROS, FRIENDSHIP, AND THE
DUAL NATURE OF INTIMACY

3.1

Introduction

In a letter to his friend Lucilius, Seneca responds to Lucilius’ hesitancy to confide
in another man whom he refers to as his friend: “You have sent me a letter by the hand of
a ‘friend’ of yours, as you call him. And then in the next sentence you warn me to avoid
discussing your affairs freely with him, since you are not even in the habit of doing so
yourself.” Immediately following this, Seneca rightly points out to Lucilius that if he
feels he cannot trust this man, it would appear that the man is not, in fact, a true friend.
As the letter continues, Seneca offers Lucilius some advice concerning how one should
approach the process of determining whether or not another person is a genuine friend:
“Certainly you should discuss everything with a friend; but before you do so, discuss in
your mind the man himself. After friendship is formed you must trust, but before that you
must judge.” A few lines later, Seneca cautions, “Think for a long time whether or not
you should admit a given person to your friendship” (34-35, italics mine).
Notable in the passages above is the emphasis Seneca places on the rational
element involved in even the earliest stages of friendship formation. His advice to
Lucilius stresses thinking, weighing merits, judgment and choosing, suggesting that
interpersonal relationships are both initiated by and structured primarily as activities of
the mind. Such a view operates under an unstated presupposition that friendship itself
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originates in the intellect, and is unsurprising given the primacy allotted to cognitive

action in Stoic tradition.
Perhaps an even more extreme case of this is expressed by Epictetus, whose
Encheiridion suggests such impersonal and counterintuitive attitudes concerning how one
should approach intimate relationships that some have questioned whether embracing
Stoicism would even allow for the existence of love11. For example, several passages in
Encheiridion offer advice about how one might manage the loss of something treasured.
Epictetus begins with a sensible suggestion: “In the case of everything attractive or useful
or that you are fond of, remember to say just what sort of thing it is, beginning with the
least little things. If you are fond of a jug, say ‘I am fond of a jug!’ For then when it is
broken you will not be upset” (#3). The idea here is that, from a rational standpoint, it
makes sense to be mindful that material objects—by their very nature—are liable to

break. Knowing this, we should expect eventual damage or loss as likely, and this
rational awareness can help mitigate our sense of loss. Seems reasonable enough. But
then Epictetus continues with this non sequitur: “If you kiss your child or your wife, say

you are kissing a human being; for when it dies you will not be upset” (#3). Setting aside
the weak analogy here (there are relevant dissimilarities between losing a material
possession and the loss of life, especially death of a loved one), what stands out is the
rationale informing Epictetus’ position. What enables him to dismiss loss of life with the
same aplomb as breaking a jug is his belief that human emotions are subject to rational
control. That one can and should exercise such control is a recurring theme throughout

See Stephens, William O. Can a Stoic Love?” Sex, Love, and Friendship: Studies of the Society for the
Philosophy of Sex and Love. Vol. 232 (1993-2003) 79-88.
11
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the Encheiridion. On the outset, “impulses, desires and aversions” are listed among

things that, according to Epictetus, are “up to us” (#1). At best, they should be relegated
to the status of being extraneous; at worst, they are menacing and should be stamped out.
His advice, after all is to “eliminate desire completely” (#4). Elsewhere he explains,

“what upsets people is not things themselves but their judgements about the things” (#5,
italics mine). Common throughout is Epictetus’ insistence on the primacy of reason over
both embodied experience and the emotions.
Epictetus’ version of Stoicism encourages what many consider to be a radical
dissociation of the body from the mind and its emotional responses that seems incoherent
at times. If the body falls under the category of “things not up to us,” while emotions are
listed among things we can control—presumably through deliberate exercise of the
will—both are essentially rendered irrelevant with respect to the role commanded by the

rational, deciding self. At the very least, his insistence that one’s own body and certain
types of emotions are separate from—or external to—the essential self cultivates a
reductive approach to human experience. As with Seneca, Epictetus’ view of

interpersonal relationships is grounded in the assumption that relationships (like
friendship) are comprised and maintained through a series of rational judgements and
chosen actions which are determined and managed irrespective of bodies.
In what follows, I want to challenge this basic claim. To do so, first we will need
to expose commonly held views concerning the role of the individual—more precisely,
the deliberative individual—in friendship formation; here we will see that in large part,
common opinion maintains that friendship is a relationship that takes a particular
individual’s acts of rational choosing to be its starting point. As we hold this view up for
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scrutiny, we will attend to the phenomenon of attraction in order to determine the role it

plays in bringing, and ultimately keeping, people together. Here I will suggest a
descriptive account of attraction as a kind of mutual recognition that both captures people
and engages them in a process of discovery. Drawing on basic insights from John

Russon’s work in the phenomenology of human experience, I show how intimacy is
dynamically developed through recognition of one’s own dually characterized position of
groundedness and openness with respect to the other. Recent work by Linda Zagzebski,
Nancy Sherman, and others offers corroborative views on the essential role the body
plays in communicating information about ourselves and others. Finally, I describe how
attraction can be characterized in terms of the recognition of shared values, including
moral, intellectual and aesthetic values.

3.2

The Phenomenon of Attraction

When you walk along the bustling sidewalks of a large city, hundreds of people

come into view, appear for a moment, and then stream past. Likewise, to whatever degree
you are noticed, you are to them an unfamiliar face among the many bodies passing by.
This experience of the flow of others with whom you will most likely never have contact,

imparts a sense of breadth, of the vastness of the human community you partake in. In
some social situations, though, the nature of the encounter with others is altered in such a
way that allows for this steady current to calm and collect into pools; interaction then

becomes more localized and thus potentially more navigable. While attending a
conference you may find yourself at a reception with several dozen individuals, all of
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whom, by virtue of their presence at this event, have indicated a degree of shared

interests, and yet, despite this commonality, you may still experience the majority of your
encounters with these new people as generally uniform in nature.
Most estimate the number of people an individual is likely to meet over the course
of a lifetime in the tens of thousands, and yet sociologists who study the dynamics of
social networking claim that one can expect to form relations of some sort—ranging in
intimacy from casual acquaintances all the way up to close friends—with between 300
and 3,000 of these people at a given time (Marlow). When you amend the data to include
only those with whom one is cognitively and practically capable of maintaining a
relationship—in terms of remembering names and faces and keeping track of basic
personal information and content related to the interconnectedness of the web—the
number drops to 150. So special is this number, in fact, that it has its own name:

Dunbar’s number. And yet, when surveyed about the number of people with whom they
believed they could share anything, the field narrows sharply, with the average American
claiming only three close friends (Marsden, cited in Marlow). Given the large number of

people we make contact with throughout our lives, especially when compared to the
small number of those with whom we nurture meaningful relationships, questions arise:
What is it about these particular people that attracted our attention in the first place, that
caused them to stand out amid a sea of others? What about them (and us) accounts for the
endurance of our most significant relationships?
One version of the story goes like this: generally speaking, we choose our friends.
I meet someone, gather data about them through a kind of detached observation, and then
receive or reject them as a friend. This narrative—of withholding oneself in rational
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deliberation until prepared to fully engage someone—is the one advocated by Seneca.

But it is also an account of friendship germination that is widely endorsed by
contemporary opinion as well. We find evidence of this view in the fact that we often
speak of individuals as either praiseworthy or culpable based on an evaluation of the

“friends they choose.” An ample collection of wisdom literature, parables and wise
sayings on this topic can be found instructing people concerning the importance of
reasoned consideration regarding the people with whom they hold company. Common to
many of these cautionary tales is the emphasis on the exclusivity of the relationship—
which is often couched in terms of personal responsibility—and on friendship as
fundamentally driven by rational decision-making. Thus, failures in friendship are
failures of deliberation.
While it is certainly true that we think about and ultimately make choices with

regards to the people we associate with, the overwhelming tendency is to prejudice the
rational element as if it were the only legitimate influence that draws people together. But
does this Stoic ‘discussion in the mind’ adequately capture the phenomenon of attraction?

What about people whose experiences of relationship initiations evince a conspicuous
absence of rational deliberation? Certainly it is not altogether uncommon for individuals
to report incidences of ‘love at first sight,’ or being inexplicably drawn to a new
acquaintance, or feeling immediately at ease in the presence of a person who is largely
unknown to them. On first consideration, such accounts might strike one as shallow,
hasty assessments that cannot possibly rest upon a solid foundation. After all, we might
think (and justifiably so) that profound, enduring love relationships such as intimate
friendships, life-partnerships, and marriages take time to develop and are much more
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invested in commitment, fidelity and the binding strength of cumulative, shared

experiences than they are concerned with initial impressions. Moreover, given the current
culture of appearance, with its attendant dysfunctional emphasis placed on projecting
oneself as through a façade of cosmetics, fashion, surgical enhancements, and non-

healthy dieting or appearance-driven exercise, we might be justly skeptical of this
purportedly instant magnetism as tending to be contrived or inauthentic.
And yet, were we to examine more closely these testimonies, we may discover
that rather than being evidence of ungrounded, superficial judgments about potential
compatibility, such phenomena might instead suggest that there is quite a bit about
ourselves that we unconsciously project through our bodies. Information about the history
of our interpersonal contacts (situations that embarrass us, circumstances where we feel
comfortable), accumulated years of evidence describing the lived-dynamic of our familial

interactions (“I fear this, but am confident here”)—all this we house physically,
externally, in our bodies. To some extent this information about us does seem apparent:
perhaps it is revealed in our posture, in gestures, or in facial expressions. If this is true,

then details such as these may be sensually available to be read and understood, to be
perceived by those who, because of their own past histories, are themselves keenly—
though probably equally unconsciously—attuned to noticing and taking up such signs.
In Anne Carson’s poetic novel, Autobiography of Red, the narrator recounts the
story of the protagonist Geryon’s first encounter with Herakles, the young man who later
becomes his lover. Their chance meeting occurs at a busy bus depot where travelers are
streaming on and off vehicles, depositing and gathering passengers before heading off
again to the next stop. The unlikelihood of the encounter is trumped only by the awkward
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circumstance of Geryon’s rounding a corner and nearly colliding into Herakles as he

steps off the bus:
The world poured back and forth between their eyes once or twice. / Other people
wishing to disembark the bus from New Mexico / were jamming up behind
Herakles who had stopped on the bottom step with his suitcase in one hand /
trying to tuck in his shirt with the other. Do you have change for a dollar? /
Geryon heard Geryon say. / No. Herakles stared straight at Geryon. But I’ll give
you a quarter for free. (39)
Significantly, Carson describes the above experience as one of mutual identification and

of epiphany. “They were two superior eels at the bottom of the tank,” she writes, “and
they recognized each other like italics.” Of Geryon’s own experience, the narrator
proclaims, “It was one of those moments that is the opposite of blindness” (39). Both
images invoked here to describe the momentous occasion of this starkly physical meeting
depict the phenomenon in terms of recognition: first as a kind of revelatory seeing, then
as an appearing—the way an object appears to one as standing out from an indistinct
background. Each is an apt expression of the experience of erotic attraction.
In Bearing Witness to Epiphany: Persons, Things and the Nature of Erotic Life,

John Russon defines erotic experience as “the fundamental bodily recognition of the
presence of another person as a person” whose way of being in the world arrests our
attention and draws us with a kind of “magnetism,” as if we are being summoned. At the

bodily level, erotic attraction is experienced as desire (for closeness, interaction,
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engagement), including a desire for the other to reciprocate our desiring 12 (Bearing

Witness 73-77). Three particulars are noteworthy here. First, that Russon’s account of the
erotic has its foundation in the body. While this may seem an obvious feature to mention,
a point that follows from this might appear somewhat less evident—at least judging from

the fact that it typically gets overlooked: namely, that all human experience is
fundamentally embodied experience. This bears upon our study because instead of
formulating the phenomenon of attraction as a kind of intellectual response to data
evaluated within our minds, Russon reminds us that as embodied beings, human sexuality
“permeates all our experience” (75). The meaningful implication here is that human
relational responses of attraction and repulsion can never be adequately understood solely
or even primarily in terms of rationality. Furthermore, given the centrality of bodily
experience, even relationships that may have previously seemed abstractly distanced
from physical considerations (so-called merely ‘Platonic’ friendships come to mind) are
shown, on this view, to be as erotic in nature as those attractions we might traditionally
refer to as sexual.

The second point to highlight about erotic experience is its characterization as a
type of recognition. Interestingly, both Carson’s portrayal of Geryon and Herakles’ love
affair and Russon’s designation of erotic experience have in common the fact that each
employs the verb ‘recognize’ in order to describe the phenomenon of attraction. In each
case, the choice of recognition as a predicate is potentially rather complex due to the
richly nuanced ways in which we frequently make use of the word. ‘Recognition,’ in a

“My erotic interest in another is the desire that my attraction for this other be welcomed and reciprocated
by this other, which is the desire that the other be desiring my desire.” (Bearing Witness 76)
12
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very basic sense, refers to an acknowledgement or acceptance (to recognize a person as a

member of an organization; to recognize a point in an argument); but it can also mean to
set apart (to be awarded recognition with an honor). Often, recognition involves a
discovery or epiphany; recognition occurs when a thing reveals itself to us and we take

notice (to finally recognize the value of hard work). In naming the “bodily recognition of
the presence of another person” an erotic experience, Russon likely intends to summon
each of these various connotations. With our bodies we acknowledge and accept the
presence of another; through our bodies we experience another as revealed to us; our
bodies are the sites which allow for the discovery of other bodies. According to Russon,
interpersonal relationships involve a noticing posture that he calls “erotic perception,”
which facilitates (and perhaps even compels) a kind of revelatory seeing which “draws us
to a focus on individual persons in their detachment from others” (75). Thus, to call my
experience of a person ‘erotic’ suggests that my gaining awareness of that person as just
that particular individual is to have them stand out to me, as when an italicized word or
phrase in the text comes forward on the page, distinct and separate from the many other
words also recorded there.
But to say that Geryon and Herakles “recognized each other like italics” is to
insist on quite a bit more than what is afforded by the relatively simple notion that the
other appears as separate and distinct. If we accept the premise that erotic experience is a
particular kind of perception, then we should also take care to specify precisely what it is
that erotic attraction notices. For Russon, the momentous realization that erotic
experience brings about is the recognition that the other is actually present in oneself.
Erotic attraction, he notes, is the “the stirring of the other in me, in my body” (73-4).
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Taken together with the first two observations, this third insight gleaned from Russon’s

discussion of erotic experience, points out a dynamic tension inherent in interpersonal
relationships. On the one hand, inasmuch as I experience a person as a person, I must
recognize them as separate from both me and everyone else; yet on the other hand, to

respond to a person with recognition is to view them in terms of identity, to see them as
importantly in me.13 Perhaps the most common usage for the word ‘recognize’ is as a
form of identification: to recognize a face is to place it, to remember that one has
encountered it before. Here re-cognition is a kind of re-thinking, where thinking refers to
a process of locating a stimulus within the known framework of one’s experience. It is a
tapping into or gaining access to something familiar, something already known.
Necessarily, such identification engages memory; and so to recognize is to come to know
again, to identify as part of one’s previous experience. This notion of recognition-asidentification is very much the sense to which Carson appeals in the quote above.
Geryon and Herakles stand-out to one another, to be sure, but they do so by virtue of
identity rather than separateness; each recognizes in the other a similar kind: “They were
two superior eels at the bottom of the tank.”
Having first suggested the inadequacy of a common Stoic view of friendship—
namely, that it emerges out of a stance of detached observation and rational reflection on
a person’s merits—we moved next to consider an alternate view: that friendship
originates in erotic attraction. We characterized this attraction as being fundamentally of
the body, and as exhibiting two distinct forms of recognition: one which viewed the other

“In me” both in the sense of a desire for nearness and touch that originates in my body as a physical urge,
and also in the sense that the physical presence of the other communicates—or reflects back to me—
familiar aspects of my own experience with which I can identity and which also serve to bind us together.
13
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as essentially separate, and a second that acknowledged the extent to which self and other

are essentially entwined. Because both forms of recognition figure as operative in
interpersonal relationships, we will now attempt to examine in greater detail the role that
erotic recognition plays in the formation and subsequent development of close friendship.

3.3

The Dual Nature of Intimacy: Recognizing the Other as Self and
the Other as Other

When Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics that a decent a man will be
“related to his friend as he is to himself, since the friend is another himself,” at least two

ways of taking up the meaning of the phrase ‘another himself’ come to mind (IX. 6).
First, another self might mean ‘another who is very like oneself.’ As indicated earlier, the
notion of likeness is closely linked to the phenomenon of recognition and it is our task to
demonstrate how recognition of the other as essentially like oneself plays an
indispensable role in bringing people together. In contrast, a second way one could
interpret Aristotle’s phrase involves viewing ‘another self’ not as an expression of the
similarity between a person and his friend, but instead as a reference to experiencing the
other as markedly different, as a potentially quite other manifestation of oneself. This
sense of the other as other will prove to be an equally essential element of friendship. In
fact, both senses—of groundedness in the familiar and of openness through the
unfamiliar—are vital to intimacy. In what follows we will consider each in turn.

Previously, we established the body as the central site of erotic attraction. In
describing the body as it is situated in the world, Russon writes, “By its nature, then, the
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body is double. It is itself, but it is itself only by being beyond itself” (Bearing Witness,

31). Developing this sense of the dual nature of bodies, he continues, “Our body is our
always being already thrown beyond ourselves, and yet it is equally our root in reality”
(31). As an inherent structural feature of embodied human experience, ambiguity figures

prominently in Russon’s work. Not only are bodies “inherently double,” perception too is
framed in terms of a fundamental ambiguity with respect to our position as observers:
“Our perceptual life is our unavoidable thrownness into the word of things. We find
ourselves simultaneously engaged and detached from things” (33). A few pages later
Russon settles on the terms ‘immersed’ and ‘detached’ to characterize our way of relating
to the things we encounter in the world. Sometimes this engagement is the familiar
relation of habituation, and as such, we recognize our immersion in things; other times it
is our ignoring of things, our detachment from them, that affords openness (37). Of most
significance to this study, though, is the application of Russon’s immersed/detached
analysis to describe the ambiguous character of erotic attraction. Like the dual
interpretation implied in Aristotle’s friend as another self, Russon’s model
simultaneously accentuates both aspects (sameness/immersion and
difference/detachment) of interpersonal experience.
Considered from the perspective of immersion, the friend is seen as exemplifying
the familiar. When comparisons are drawn, what is noticed is the sense in which the two
individuals are similar. For example, my friend may seem to be another like myself
because we have similar personal histories. We may both be children of divorced parents;
we might each have grown up in large cities where we experienced the feeling of
anonymity; we might also discover that we both come from families where certain
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religious beliefs were highly influential. Conversely, although we might discover that we

have vastly different family histories, we may come to realize that the ways we have
processed these histories and incorporated lessons from them into our lives, are in fact
similar. For instance, I might come from a large, tightly knit family unit where every

member’s actions were closely monitored by the group. My friend, on the other hand,
may have been an only child who experienced a great deal of freedom, but who often felt
alone because her actions were generally unsupervised. As a result of our separate
reflections upon these dissimilar situations, each of us in our adult lives may have come
to prefer small, intimate gatherings. My response can be seen as a rejection of feeling
continually pressured by the scrutiny of an oversized community, while my friend’s is an
expression of disdain for the isolation and disconnectedness she experienced throughout
her youth.

The above examples illustrate circumstances where, ultimately, individuals come
to view one another as familiar other-selves largely out of recognition of commonality.
Similar strands in familial history, shared experiences, reactions that indicate like-minded

approaches in value judgment—all this information contributes to the sense of a
relationship as immersed within the familiar. And yet, as seen earlier, such concrete
details need not emerge through actual accumulation of simultaneous shared experiences
(i.e. going camping together in order to ‘build memories’), neither does a sense of
immersion require focused discussion and overt revelation of these areas of commonality.
Because erotic attraction is initiated at the bodily level14, often a great deal of evidence

14

Generally speaking. Certainly one may experience erotic attraction toward someone they have never
encountered bodily (in person)—in the context of an online relationship, for example. In such cases,
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attesting either to the compatibility or incompatibility of two people’s experiences is

manifest even without concentrated mental effort.
While recognition of the familiar self within the other can occur instantaneously,
as it did with the example of Geryon and Herakles, it may also take the form of a more
gradual unfolding, as in situations where verbal contact with a person opens up further
avenues of exploration. Language itself is an extremely rich outlet for erotic expression.
In Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis and the Elements of Everyday Life, Russon
names the “arena of communication” as the primary location through which we engage
most meaningfully with other humans in order to “negotiate our self-identity in light of
the experience of others” (112). As examples of the most intimate and formative kinds of
communication, he cites language and sex. “Language,” he goes on to say, “can be seen
as the development of our sexuality [and] is the most profound sphere of self-

presentation, of self-expression” (113). Certainly the linguistic realm never ceases to be
revelatory, for each linguistic expression—whether written or vocalized—contains a
history of one’s experiences both with the language itself and with situations of the type

at hand. Thus, having the right words to say or being at a loss for words, and indeed
opting to speak or choosing to remain silent in a given situation, are linguistic gestures
that are partially suggestive of a person’s identity. Details such as speaking with either
subtle or exaggerated vocal inflections, word choices, and even the pace of a speaker’s
discourse may be indicative (pauses of reluctance, steadiness of ordered precision and
care, breathlessness of blithe excitement) and therefore informative as a means of

Russon’s discussion of language as a medium for self-expression—including erotic expression—is perhaps
most applicable.

71

recognizing common strains of experience or opinion. Something as basic as the sound of

a voice can even offer insights into the entire narrative arch of a person’s life, beginning
with the most basic of life stories (a person’s level of education and the geographic
region of their origin, for example) that may prove to be potential sites of engagement

with that person.15
We have thus far considered a model for intimacy that characterizes attraction as
a kind of mutual recognition involving coming to experience, through bodily means,
another person as taken to be like oneself. But this only a partial account of the erotic
attraction that is foundational to human intimacy. The other mode of recognition is the
form of interaction Russon characterizes as detached. When we encounter a person as
detached from our lived experience, they present themselves to us as unfamiliar. Some
forms of the unfamiliar are foreign to our experience because we have come to routinely

reject them. In this case we may either reject them out of habit, or based on principle.
What is rejected on principle are those things about which we have undertaken rational
deliberation, and generally speaking, such positions are altered slowly and only then

through a modified, yet equally rational process of reflection. Our current study, with its
focus on the primarily sub-conscious, embodied aspects of interpersonal relations, will
elide such concerns and will concentrate instead on the pre- or non-rational instigators of
our repulsion.
Much of what we reject is likely accomplished by mere force of habit; other
things, we may find, are only implicitly rejected by us—simply through default—as we

15

For a detailed account of Russon’s treatment of language, see also Human Experience, 112-118.
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do not yet contain within ourselves the means for their discovery. In each of these last

two cases, the unfamiliarity of the person who is conversant in these areas, may appear to
us as alien, perhaps even profoundly detached from our experience, and yet still not
completely unavailable. If the experience of the other captures my interest and “calls” to

me as Russon has described, if it “pulls” me toward discovery and “elicits my selftranscendence, elicits my learning”—then, to experience the other in this way, as
otherwise-than-ourselves and simultaneously (at least potentially) available to our
experience, is to recognize erotic attraction figured in its detached form (Bearing Witness
74-5). Here the other is truly other, and as such, offers not a vision of ourselves as
comfortably situated in familiarity, but rather as challenged to experience freedom,
opportunity, and openness. Russon develops this sense of detached experience in Bearing
Witness to Epiphany, where he contrasts the ways in which we “comfortably take root in
our rooms, our families, our streets, our garments, our friends” against the power of
epiphany to “break us out of our comfortable attitude” (37-8). In a later discussion,
Russon highlights the potentially transformative power of erotic attraction, commenting
that “the erotic other calls me out of my static routines, calling me to be a unique,
singular agent” (75).
While the benefits afforded by interaction with others seem clear (the differences
of others open up a space for development, not available within the context of the
familiar), we have not yet touched on the issue of describing why a detached other might
appear to one as a possibility rather than simply an incomprehensible and consequently
inaccessible other. Again, if all others represent potential ways for our being otherwise,
why do only particular others summon us and we them? It is best at this point to make
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explicit a point that has been operative throughout the previous discussion, and yet has

remained unstated. What until now we have been referring to as individual experiences of
recognition—either of groundedness in the familiar or openness to difference—is, in
cases of attraction, actually a mutually experienced phenomenon. As Russon points out in

both Human Experience and Bearing Witness to Epiphany, all of the interpersonal
relations and interactions we have been talking about (erotic attraction, touch, friendship)
exist only inasmuch as these feelings, urgings, and reaching-out are gestures that are
accepted and also taken up by each person involved. 16 Under this assumption, when we
speak of a person recognizing herself as situated in a relationship of immersed familiarity
with respect to another, we must also assume that if in fact there is legitimate grounding
for this recognition, then it is available to be recognized by the other as well. Such a
process of mutual conditioning is certainly embedded in the structure of erotic attraction.
For in order to come to recognize the presence of another in oneself (as Russon describes
erotic experience), that other must necessarily be simultaneously recognizing and
accepting you as another as well.

Similarly, in order for the differences noticed by erotic attraction to appear as
potentialities and not merely obstacles, each person must represent for their respective
others some combination of being-otherwise that is desirable to each. The fact that for
any two people, differences will likely overwhelm similarities, also suggests that the
foreign elements in each potential friend must align in such a way as to match up

This may be a potential problem for Russon’s argument, at least as it stands, as it seems we can think of
cases where one might be erotically attracted to someone who does not respond with reciprocity.
Unrequited love comes to mind, and also situations where someone may ‘admire from afar’ having escaped
(or failed to capture) the attention of the other.
16
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opportunities sought with willingness to share in a relationship. Ultimately what this

seems to suggest is that the few intimate friendships we enjoy as humans can be better
understood by considering the mutually reinforcing interaction among the various
oppositions we’ve discussed: groundedness and openness, similarity and difference, self

and other.

3.4

The Recognition of Values

Russon is not alone in acknowledging the significance of non-cognitive cues
communicated through our bodies; nor is he the first to recognize the contribution that
such information lends to human interactions. In developing her account of the
importance of exemplars to an individual’s moral development, Linda Zagzebski
describes how observation of an exceptional person can capture one’s attention and how
this may result in the observer feeling motivated to imitate the exemplar’s behavior.
“There are people whose moral beauty attracts us,” she says, “We are usually drawn to

them initially because we admire something easily observable about them—typically,
their acts, although it could also be something about their physical bearing or speech”
(60). To illustrate her point, Zagzebski highlights several historical figures as role models

and describes the qualities she thinks makes them paradigms of morality. Citing previous
work from Amy Olberding, Zagzebski notes that contemporaries of Confucius frequently
commented on the exceptional quality of the outward, physical aspects of his daily

interchanges with others. His unwavering conscientiousness, his polite, courteous
movements and respectful manner—these external features of Confucius’ bodily
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comportment attracted followers who found themselves drawn to him, at least initially,

based on observation alone (86).
Without calling such attraction erotic, Zagzebski considers the role the body plays
in this process, noting that “a person’s physical bearing, movement, and manner of
speaking are expressions of his moral character” (86). Like Russon, Zagzebski thinks that
in our everyday interactions with others, we are acutely aware of a wide array of noncognitive bodily cues; but because she is interested in describing how exemplars can
impact the moral development of others, Zagzebski focuses on a particular kind of
noticing that Ian Kidd has called moral attraction. In “Admiration, Attraction, and the
Aesthetics of Exemplarity,” Kidd discusses this notion of moral attraction, which he
describes in the following terms: “The inner beauty of exemplars is primarily experienced
as moral attraction: the aesthetically charged admiration for their virtues or excellences as

expressed in forms of bodily comportment experienced as beautiful” (sec. 3, par. 13).
Notable here is the sense in which physical cues such as gestures and speech acts serve as
outward manifestations which convey essential information about the internal state of an

individual. Although this information-gathering initially plays out at an unconscious
level, Zagzebski believes we eventually “seek to identify the psychological source of
those acts” (86). She goes on to refer to these sources as deep “structures” and suggests
that they represent a kind of internalized distillation of character embedded within (61,
65, 86).
Russon, Zagzebski, and Kidd have each identified contexts where aspects of a
person’s physical presence convey essential information about themselves to another.
Although Russon focuses on erotic perception while Zagzebski and Kidd turn their
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attention toward what might be called moral perception, all are interested in the way our

physical embodiment as humans seems to engage with, speak to, and reveal things about
us to other persons’ bodies, independent of—or at least prior to—our awareness of
cognitive processes. What is lacking from each of these accounts, however, is identifying

this experience as a kind of recognition, and then connecting this with the phenomenon
of attraction by describing exactly what it is that we recognize when we are drawn to
another. As mentioned earlier, I want to suggest that in our attraction to another person,
the features we recognize in their physical movements, gestures, bodily comportment,
and speech are expressions of the values held by that person. Some of these values are
tied to personality traits we may already possess in common with our potential friend,
while some values we learn from others; they are things we did not previously appreciate
that we come to understand and subsequently value though our attraction to another. In
describing attraction as the recognition of values, I would include three main types:
moral, intellectual, and aesthetic. I will now discuss each in turn.
3.4.1

Moral Values

In his article titled “Friendship,” Laurence Thomas gives an account of an
intimate relationship he calls “companion friendship.” Although he does not go as far as
Russon in suggesting an overt sexual component to these companionate friendships,
Thomas does point out that in some significant ways, they tend to resemble the erotic
love shared by romantic lovers: “Now, people are often said to fall in love. I hold that a
similar phenomenon can occur with friendship” (218). In particular, he argues that rather
than being the product of conscious decision-making, “there is a sense in which
friendships happen to us” (218). In fact, he explains that in companion friendship, the
77

“initial feelings of love are sometimes experienced as an onslaught” (218, italics mine).

Elsewhere, he notes that in the same way strong emotions are often associated with
romantic love, within the context of certain kinds of friendship, one may feel “besieged
by feelings of love for so-and-so, as opposed to choosing to have those feelings” (218).

The fact that we may be surprised by our feelings (or perhaps the intensity of those
feelings) suggests that on a cognitive level, we are frequently unaware of much of what is
happening at the level of the body. Similar to the deep psychological structures Zagzebski
describes as unseen influences of outward behavior, we generally have no clearly formed
notion of what draws us to a particular person until after we have already begun to
develop a relationship. Only then does the rational mind seek reasons for our feelings
‘after the fact,’ so to speak.
My primary interest in Thomas’ account, though, has to do with a claim he

makes— rather in passing—that in the case of companion friends, the relationship “will
be harmonious only if the parties involved are sufficiently attuned to the way in which
each other views and interacts with the world.” Later, he specifies that intimate friendship

“requires a shared conception of the good” (220). Here, I think Thomas touches upon a
broader point I would like to make with respect to the unconscious attraction we
experience with certain others. Thomas does not explain what he means by ‘sufficiently
attuned,’ nor does he provide details concerning how friends might come to know one
another’s views—whether this happens through conversation over time, or as we might
infer from his wording, that friends come to understand one another through observing
physical actions and mannerisms as each ‘interacts with the world.’ This is where I think
an account of attraction as the recognition of values is useful because it helps explain the
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element of surprise: some friends are unexpected because unbeknownst to our conscious

minds, our bodies are conveying and receiving information about values and views, up to
and including our notion of ‘the good.’
At a reception, you are seated among strangers at a table where an obviously
overwhelmed server solicits drink orders. Nearly everyone asks for white wine, except a
woman who requests red. When the server returns with a bottle, you notice he
inadvertently fills each glass with white wine, including the one belonging to the woman.
For a moment it appears she might speak, but instead she smiles and allows the error to
pass without comment. Although this small gesture (overlooking an inconsequential
mistake) unfolds in an environment full of external stimuli, it captures your attention as a
simple act of kindness. The woman’s reaction—that flash of seeing-dismissing-smiling—
reveals something about her priorities (this is not important), her flexibility (I can enjoy

white wine), and her attunement to the fine points of a situation (observing the server’s
stress level). In turn, the extent to which you notice this interaction in the first place—
coupled with the fact that it also strikes you as meaningful and important—reveals

something about you. Namely, your noticing stance suggests that her gesture arrests you
(your physical perception) on a subconscious level. Insomuch as your body is engaged
with the situation—participating as an observer—we might say it is attuned to recognize
the woman’s reaction and to ‘take it up’ in some way. If her actions express qualities you
appreciate and value—in this case the moral virtue of kindness—then they resonate
within you in a positive way as attraction. If the situation were different and she
responded rudely by making too much of the error, protesting loudly or with disdain,
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such behavior would register as a violation of your moral values and would be

experienced instead as repulsion.
3.4.2

Intellectual Values

Depending on your own intellectual habits and interests, various kinds of actions,
gestures and body language will stand out to you. On a walk in a park someone pauses
contemplatively to jot down an idea in a notebook and you wonder if they are a writer. A

person you attend class with has flecks of paint on her hands each time you meet and so
you assume she is an artist. Without thinking about it, you find yourself standing in the
back row of an outdoor play. Someone else in your periphery—also in the outskirts—is

half paying attention, half watching other people watch the play. In each of these
situations, the details you tune into—that may ultimately lead to making eye contact, or
prompt a nod, or draw you into speaking to or approaching them—may not at first be
consciously available to you. That is: you may not know what, exactly, suggests to you
that this particular person might be open to engagement. You may not know, for instance,
that you had seen the paint for several consecutive weeks before you actually ‘noticed’ it,
that your conception of this individual already involved the unexamined assumption of a
shared interest in art, that all the information streaming in at the level of bodily
perception contributed to your feeling drawn to this person.
We may of course get it wrong in our initial pre-cognitive estimation of someone.
That potential artist-friend from class might be a house painter with no experience or

interest in creative endeavors. It may likewise turn out that a person you encounter is
behaving in a manner atypical to them, or reacting to circumstances which do not align
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with your assumptions. The fellow people-watcher might not be an observant introvert

looking for his next short story, but someone separated from companions who is scanning
the crowd trying to locate members of his party. Nonetheless, neither of these cases
nullifies the fact that physical cues provide essential first impressions through which

subsequent information is filtered and interpreted. My first ‘introduction’ to someone
might be a phrase picked out of the din of a crowded room where I overhear them talking
about a film I found memorable. Similarly, my underlying enthusiasm for a literary genre
or an obsession with a particular book is available for others to take up with interest if
while speaking I quote or refer to characters or some plot detail that is recognized and
mutually appreciated. Alternately, you may catch my attention as the person who winced
slightly when someone else mentions how much fun they had at karaoke the other night;
you may also glimpse the eyebrow grimace I attempted to hide at the same time. In each
of the above scenarios, information about myself and others—situations I/we find
undesirable and information about what I/they value from an intellectual standpoint—is
communicated and perceived through bodily channels prior to being taken up for
consideration by conscious reasoning.
Although film interests, reading preferences, and entertainment choices are to a
certain extent matters of taste, one’s taste is frequently informed by more deeply held
intellectual and aesthetic values. Given this, some observations will be more informative
than others. If I see you reading JAMA, for example, my immediate assumption will be
that you have an interest in medicine (either professional or intellectual). Underlying this
choice of reading material, however, is evidence of an intellectual value: a considered
appreciation for (or intellectual confidence in) the merits of scientific research and study.
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Similarly, an overheard conversation involving a topic from a recent radio program might

convey information about both taste (he listens to NPR) and intellectual values (political
beliefs).
3.4.3

Aesthetic Values

The things we consider beautiful are revealing. For example, if I find a particular
style of architecture—say Shaker design—aesthetically appealing, deliberate examination

into why this is so might uncover reasons behind my preferences. I may discover that I
respond favorably to particular elements such as balance, symmetry, clean lines, order
and simplicity. In addition to these aesthetic features, I may also be registering approval

for other aspects of the Shaker philosophy of design out of which this architectural
approach grew—the focus on utilitarian function for shared spaces, or the emphasis on
quality materials and craftsmanship, for example. Given this, it appears that the things we
find beautiful are ultimately indicative of the kinds of things we value. Although I can
identify these values through a deliberative process like the one just described, this need
not be the case.
Walking through an art museum with a tour group one might notice how small
clusters of people break away in order to visit areas that reflect their various interests.

Who goes where, how long they linger in front of which pieces, what works they merely
glance at and which ones they study, whether they ask questions, read about, or take
pictures of the pieces—all these actions provide information about both the aesthetic and

intellectual values of the individuals. Whether these perceptual details ‘register’ and
ultimately translate into friendship involves a complex interchange of perceptive
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discovery (taking a noticing stance with respect to another person), mutual recognition of

shared values, and compatibility. If, for example, I end up eating lunch with a small
group who has more or less travelled the same path through the museum, my experiences
over the course of the day—my accumulated perceptions—play a role in determining

whom I sit beside, whether or not we talk, and what we talk about. This same
phenomenon simultaneously plays out among the others as well. A person who speaks to
me may have noticed my careful attention to certain pieces of art, my disinterest in
others, my standing off to the side reading artists’ statements. Such lingerings, pauses and
puzzled stares (what, exactly, is going on with this piece?) may stand out because such
perceptions resonate with their own. Likewise, the person I feel comfortable sitting
beside (for no reason immediately apparent to me) might be the same one I almost
bumped into as we waited to view a piece, or whose path crossed in front of, or beside
my line of vision a few times as we navigated back and forth among rooms in the
collection. Cases like these demonstrate how two people with similar aesthetic
sensibilities might experience the beginning of a potential friendship as they recognize
familiar elements in each other and experience this discovery as an invitation to further
exploration—as attraction.
We have already mentioned friendships which highlight similarity. Here, the
orientation is toward engagement with others with whom we share personality traits,
dispositions, and interests. Attributing this kind of relationship to Aristotle’s notion of the
‘friend as another oneself,’ Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews call this the “mirror
view,” noting that in this case the friend acts as a mirror, reflecting back an image of our
own established way of viewing ourselves (226). This might involve friends who are
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interested in the same subject matter, or who ask and seek answers to similar questions.

In this context, friends may acknowledge their values and manifest them through ongoing
acts of sharing (pieces of art, music or film that fall within the range of established
categories of preference); they may discuss creative endeavors, or simply engage in the

appreciation of art together, or on behalf of the other.
Our previous discussion also revealed that there is another, quite different way to
conceive of friendship where instead of responding to familiar, established norms, friends
make available to each other novel experiences and offer avenues of growth and
opportunities for the expansion of values. Cocking calls this the “drawing view” after the
sense in which one is drawn along by the friend into unfamiliar territory, toward new
experiences (226). Suppose a friendship does develop between me and my fellow tourist
at the art museum. While it may be true that recognition of similar aesthetic interests

drew us together in the first place, over time I might come to learn that my friend also
loves contemporary abstract art, and he discovers I have a peculiar fascination with
Italian Renaissance frescos. Prior to our friendship, both of us had been dismissive of the

aesthetic style evoked by these respective genres; each seemed unable to understand or
appreciate what they had to offer. And yet, because my friend sees value in this kind of
artistic expression, I am suddenly afforded new reasons and motivation to see things
differently. It then becomes possible for me to “find myself influenced in a new direction
which lies outside what I . . . thought properly expressive of my interests” and, as
Cocking and Matthews observe, “I may thus grow and develop in ways that reflect the
character of my friend” (227).
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Now, I would argue in cases like this, that what draws people together in spite of

the distinct separateness of their positions as alien to one another, is the direction of the
opportunities they represent: namely, they are both still oriented in the direction of
underlying shared values. In the example above, perhaps the friend is able to show how

abstract art fits into an already existing (shared) interpretive framework, such as one
borrowed from literary criticism, or some other realm familiar to each. Conversely,
functioning in the capacity of an other, a friend might introduce a completely new value
for consideration as well. In this instance, the friend epitomizes a radically different
perspective that opens up new possibilities and makes space available for further
development to unfold for their companion.
3.4.4

Do Opposites Attract?

At this point, one may wonder about cases where it seems like, rather than two
people recognizing shared values, they are responding instead to differences embodied in
the other—cases where one might say, ‘opposites attract.’ As an example of this, consider
the interaction between Elizabeth Bennet and Mr. Darcy in Jane Austen’s Pride and
Prejudice. For most of the novel these two characters are presented as clashing in
opposition. Rather than being drawn to one another, each views the other with disdain;
they are critical of one another (appearance, behavior, personality traits) and engage in
heated verbal sparring. And yet the fact that they eventually find themselves attracted to
one another and end up marrying (and are very much in love) seems to suggest that
perhaps opposites do attract. But I do not think this is the case.
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While it is certainly true that Elizabeth and Darcy hail from vastly differing social

and economic circumstances, their happy union occurs despite this opposition, rather than
in response to it. I would argue that minor differences aside (yes, Mr. Darcy, it can be
pleasurable to dance with the right person), Elizabeth and Darcy are more alike than they

are different; moreover, their seeming to be opposites is more a function of their mutual
misreading of one another (a failure of first impressions17) than it is a reflection of deepseated essence. Once these errors are corrected, the other becomes scrutable as they each
recognize and appreciate core values from which the words and actions in question have
arisen. For instance, it becomes clear that both pursued actions motivated by a desire to
protect the interests of loved ones (Darcy his friend Bingley; Elizabeth, her sister Jane).
They also have similar, and strikingly unconventional notions of marriage, which is
especially poignant given the time period: namely, they share the view that marriage is
more than a pragmatic social arrangement aimed at combining social and economic
assets. Instead, both Elizabeth and Darcy believe an ideal marriage should also involve
the convergence of compatible hearts and minds united in love.

Even their personalities are more similar than different: they are both strongwilled, outwardly confident, sharp-witted, prideful and quick to judge. In fact, it is
because of these shared features that they each make the same mistakes in misreading the
others’ actions and motivations. Elizabeth attributes Darcy’s aloofness to arrogance
alone, rather than disdain for the schemings of the Mrs. Bennets of the world;
simultaneously, he thinks Elizabeth is just another desperate young woman willing to
abandon decorum in order to “be noticed” in hopes of securing a wealthy husband. It is

17

Austen’s working title for the novel was First Impressions.
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only when each breaks through the errors of their initial (and ongoing) impressions that

they actually ‘see’ one another, recognize shared values, and experience feeling drawn to
those values as expressed (so persuasively, so attractively) in that particular individual:
‘Elizabeth,’ ‘Mr. Darcy.’
Because of this, I think that for the deepest, most meaningful kind of attraction to
occur, two individuals must have a particular valence with respect to one another—some
already existing points of connection—of sameness. For without such common values
and character traits, their separateness might threaten to render them merely separate, and
the relationship may never have gotten off the ground in the first place.

3.5

Conclusion

We began this essay considering the implications of some advice Seneca offers
concerning friendship; namely, that if you want to cultivate trust within friendship, you
should exercise judgement and serious consideration before entering into a close
relationship. On the face of it—and given the specific circumstances of the intended

recipient (Lucilius’ involvement with a ‘friend’ he did not trust)—this stands as fairly
sound advice. Certainly Seneca is correct in pointing out the strangeness of Lucilius
calling an untrustworthy man ‘friend.’ Additionally, I doubt anyone would suggest there

is no place for rational deliberation and choice within friendship. My quarrel with
Seneca, and with the broader context of Stoic tradition from which comments like the
following originate—“Think for a long time whether or not you should admit a given

person to your friendship”—is that such admonishment places unbalanced emphasis on
the cognitive aspect of experience, shifts undue burden onto the deliberative process, and
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assumes an exaggerated sense of control over things which are not the proper subjects of

rational choosing. One factor motivating this essay was to offer a corrective to such
excesses, to provide an alternate account of the earliest stages of friendship formation that
more accurately reflects the essential role of embodied experience.
Perhaps one reason why body language plays such an important role in friendship
formation is partly due to the sense in which (to borrow language from Epictetus) ‘our
bodies are not up to us.’ Because some types of physical responses are not entirely
within our control, when gestures, facial expressions, and mannerisms suggest
information to others, they truly are representative of some deep element inside
responding to and interacting with a deep element within another person. 18 If two people
respond to such perceptions by noticing them in each other, if they respond with mutual
interest, feeling summoned by the other, I have suggested this is indicative of shared

values. Whether we are speaking of moral values such as kindness, intellectual values
like creative expression through writing, or aesthetic values like simplicity, on a basic
level, when we are attracted to someone, when physical cues available to our perception

arrest our attention and draw us toward further interaction with a particular person, we
are responding with recognition and endorsement of those values.

In “Of Manners and Morals” Nancy Sherman examines the impact decorum has on behavior. Is there a
connection, she wonders, between going through the motions of an action (i.e. forcing ourselves to act
courteous when another is rude even though we would rather not) and actually manifesting the behavior
implied by the action (i.e. becoming courteous)? Among the behavioral cues Sherman discusses,
“emotional demeanour, bodily comportment, and tone of voice” are listed as the “material elements of
decorum”(280). Interestingly, Sherman cites examples from another Stoic, Cicero, whose treatise On
Duties notes that “a careful observer can read into our characters, ‘from a glance of the eyes, from the
relaxation or contraction of an eyebrow, from sadness, cheerfulness or laughter, from speech or from
silence, from a raising or lower[ing] of the voice, and so on.’” (qtd in Sherman 281).
18
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